Using Strawson 's Arguments About The Numerical And Identity Problems

I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and

In essence, Cartesian Dualism attempts to solve the mind-body problem – that is, what is the relationship between the mind and the body? The answer, according to this theory, is that the mind and the body are two distinctly different substances that constitute each person. Here, “mind” can be described as a nonphysical thing that thinks and “body” as a living physical thing that does not think. The mind can also exist independently of the body, and both can causally affect one another.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes states “I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing”. [1] The concept that the mind is an intangible, thinking entity while the body is a tangible entity not capable of thought is known as Cartesian Dualism. The purpose of this essay is to examine how Descartes tries to prove that the mind or soul is, in its essential nature, entirely distinct from the

What is the mind-body problem? The mind-body problem asks the question, are the mind and body separate substances of elements of the same substance? In this paper I wish to propose, and try to provide support for Descartes notion of the immaterial mind, by critically discussing the view of substance dualism, pertaining to the relationship between the mind and body. The two arguments of which I will provide in this paper to support this view are divisibility and disembodied existence. There are two fundamentally different substances in this universe, physical and mental properties, this paper will explore both of these substances (8).

This essay assesses property dualism, a theory of mind. It proclaims the existence of a single, physical substance (unlike Cartesian dualism), but argues that this single substance has two potential properties: physical and mental states that are not reducible.

Substance dualism is a never ending argument in the Philosophy world as it’s been going on for decades. It is the view that the universe contains two important types of entity which is mental and material. The structure of this paper is that four main argument leads to one conclusion. Firstly, I’ll argue about Descartes’s ‘separability argument’ which stands as the definition of Substance Dualism. Secondly, I’ll argue that mental and physical have different and perhaps irreconcilable properties. An argument is not complete without a counter argument which in this case the “pairing” problem that exists in Descartes theory is highlighted and where is the interaction of material and immaterial takes

In Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy, he introduces the divisibility argument for his idea of mind-body dualism. It argues that the mind is distinct from the body and that they are different "substances". The argument has two premises; the mind is indivisible and the body is divisible. In this essay, I will interpret Descartes' argument by discussing the key points of these premises and how they are supported. I will also be incorporating my own thoughts on the argument to determine whether the divisibility argument is enough to validate the idea of mind-body dualism.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

For in Descartes terms, it was plausible to doubt that one has a body, but impossible to doubt the existence of one’s mind; therefore “…self and mind must be identical” (Palmer 162).

The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.

ABSTRACT: Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body are often understood as conceptions that contradict each other. Diachronic interpretations maintain that Descartes was first a dualist (in the Meditations) and later on developed his stance on the union of mind and body (Passions). Some authors find here a problem without solution. Nevertheless, in the last two decades, some interpretations have been developed intending to give a positive solution to the difficult relation between Cartesian dualism and the union of mind and body. The problem that I find in most of them is that they try to show no incoherence between Descartes' dualism and his conception of the union and

To support his claim of dualism, Descartes presents a number of arguments that attempt to prove that the mind is separate from his body. Two of his strongest points are from the conceivability argument and divisibility argument. Further reinforcement of his claims comes from the idea of privileged first-person access, where he concludes that only an individual has full access to his own thoughts and state of mind.

In this paper, I will examine a particular model of the relationship between the mind and body that I find especially attractive: Margaret Cavendish’s Panpsychism. In my discussion of Cavendish’s Panpsychism, I will contrast it with two other models -- namely, Descartes’s Substance Dualism and Hobbes’s Materialism -- to accentuate particular nuances of the model. Next, I will provide reasoning for why I find Cavendish’s Panpsychism so attractive. After, I will consider the strongest argument I believe one could make against my specific support of Cavendish’s Panpsychism; an objection known as the  “Combination Problem.” Finally, I will provide a rebuttal to this objection; one that will render my argument in favor of Cavendish’s Panpsychism even stronger.

It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake”(Ryle 26). Ryle's thesis in The Concept of Mind is that the official doctrine has key principles that “are unsound and that conflict with the whole body of what we know about minds when we are not speculating about them”(Ryle 23). Laid out, the official doctrine retain that every person has a body and a mind, that they are normally “harnessed” together and that after death of a body the mind may continue to function and exists. Cartesian theory summarized; embraces that volitional acts of the body are caused by volitionl acts of the mind thus mental acts determine physical acts. Ryle thought the ‘official theory’ was absurd or bitter like, and labels it “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”.