Volkswagen: Breaking The Law

Volkswagen is one of the largest automakers in the world and it has a global reputation as a high-quality German auto brand. Social responsibility is included in VW’s corporate culture and it seems that Volkswagen made some advances in Corporate Social Responsibility because the corporation was ranked 11th 2015 in the Global CSR Rep Track 100, which listed companies by reputation (Reputation Institute, 2015).However, the company has been threatened by an emission scandal which broke in September 2015, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disclosed that Volkswagen had installed defeat devices on diesel cars which were sold in the US. These devices equipped on VW cars cheated regulators in such a way that it could detect

The second item is if VW would be unwilling to change its ways and value sales and profit over integrity to stakeholders. VW was already caught cheating just to win awards and surpass its completion, but if its willing to continually do this and not change for the better it would be best not to continue the engagement with the organization.

“Every person is to be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God” (Romans 13:1). This verse provides the spiritual rule, that when followed, prevents many negative incidents and their consequences. However, the engineers broke this command and made conscious decisions to design, develop, and produce vehicles that violated established law. In fact, the emissions produced were, “…as much as 40 times what is allowed by the U.S. standard defined by the Clean Air Act” (Mercuri & Neumann, 2016, p. 24).

The mistrust between the Volkswagen Company and their customers developed after the scandal associated with the incorrect emission of data and cheating of the system unfolded.  The scandal occurred on the eighteenth of September 2015 when it was found that the company had made a car with a turbo that released emission directly into the real word atmosphere. The allegations were genuine and were proved by the Environment Protection Agency in the United States (EPA) (Hotten, 2016).The chief

Volkswagen is under investigation following reports from the EPA that they had installed software into their engines that deceived emissions testers. Furthermore, engineers updated this software in 2014, claiming that they were improving the vehicles. James Liang, a senior engineer who had worked for Volkswagen for 30 years, admitted to investigators in September of 2016 that he had designed the software in question. Further investigation has revealed that this conspiracy may have involved executives of the company. It is unknown to the public whether Liang was acting under orders when he designed the software or he decided to create it on his own to meet requirements his superiors gave him. Both rule utilitarianism and Kantian duty ethics

ast night, the headline in a prominent German paper read that the Volkswagen compliance chief, Mrs. Hohmann-Dennhardt, will receive 12 million euro payout for quitting her job that was to run until the end of 2018. She had been hired to clean up Volkswagen's damaged image brought about by diesel emissions scandal. A challenging undertaking with millions of disgruntled customers spread across the globe. Hohmann-Dennhardt, justifies the payout with her claim that she fulfilled the contract (Germis & Knop, 2017).

Loss of reputation and sales; fines for VW → loss of status and being made responsible for the scandal

As a multinational corporation, the implication of the scandal determines the fate of numerous stakeholders both internal and external. Internal stakeholders comprise of the board, managers and employees while external stakeholders subsume shareholders, customers and suppliers. The economic, political and social impacts of the dishonest practices would shape the fate of Volkswagen and affect the future prospects of the automotive industry. Common shareholders whilst not involved in the day to day running of the business placed faith and belief in the firm by providing capital had suffered severe economic loss as share prices (get something for stat). Despite the callous deception in advertising the defeat device displayed no signs of disturbing vehicle performance, however, customers of Volkswagen and its subsidiary vehicles suffer from lower resale value. In addition, even though the scandal was global, European consumers were the most affected with diesel cars accounting for 41% of all European cars (Fontaras, 2016). This high percentage in respect to other nations is a result of incentives provided by the European Union for the purchase of diesel vehicles such as subsidies towards the production process resulting in lower premiums compared to petrol counterparts (Vidal, 2015) In additional with sales falling suppliers of Volkswagen would likely lose future contracts or have current contracts downgraded as less parts are required. Thus, this loss of future

The people at the West Virginia had tested vehicles as well as the EPA (Patel). Volkswagen chose to include rout programming device to cheat the system to pass the testing laws. Volkswagen as a corporation was basically trying to cut the cost of engines to be built by limiting the NOx emission system that controls how much dirty chemicals that goes into the air (Patel).By the company putting this device in their cars they were trying to cut down the cost that they would have to spend, at the same time Volkswagen cars had better performance. The ethical question would be is it really worth it to CHOSE to overlook the laws to save money on cash (Patel). "We expected better from Volkswagen," said Cynthia Giles, the E.P.A's. colleague manager for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance. She called the automaker's activities "a danger to general health of our

It is not hard to see that the scandal would cause a horrid blow to VW’s image. Until the incident, VW had, like many other German companies, the reputation of “German engineering” (Robertson, 2013). However, instead of using that innovation to develop diesel-fueled cars compliant with U.S. standards, it decided to try to scam its way in the market. Not only did the company admit to having 11 million cars with software intended to cheat tests (Gates, Ewing, Russell & Watkins, 2017), it also plead guilty to “destroying evidence in an elaborate cover-up” (VW Admits Emissions Cheating and Cover-up, 2017); building further distrust among its consumers.

technology project. The BPTO produced weekly status reports and monthly budget reviews helping the company gauge where it was heading towards. Thus the alignment started advancing (Austin, 2007).

1) What is your assessment of the new process for managing priorities at Volkswagen of America? Are the criticisms justified? Is it an improvement over the old process?

Well, throughout this case there was a sense of internal war between the executives of two of the world’s largest automobile companies. Wiedeking, the CEO of Porsche, can be seen as a dominating personality throughout this case. Wiedeking was famous for his efficient production and astute marketing, which turned Porsche into world’s most profitable car company. Therefore, keeping this same attitude in mind, he wanted to make some major changes in the Volkswagen group(VW) because he was aiming to achieve something big. He wanted to remove inefficient operations and also insisted on shutting down the production lines of some cars like ‘Phaeton’ and ‘Buggati’, which according to him were not highly profitable and were a commercial failure. On the other hand, Ferdinand Piech, the CEO of Volkswagen group, had something else in his mind. Unlike Wiedeking, who only focused

Ferry Porsche designed the firm’s first car, the Porsche 356. Although its body was an original design many Volkswagen parts were used to save costs. The original car was fast and very light weight, gaining attention by taking first place in the Innsbruck city race. Production was transferred from Austria to Stuttgart in 1950. The firm focused on performance and continued to reengineer and refine the car. By the late 1950’s the Porsche 356 utilized far fewer parts from Volkswagen. Figure 3 shows a 1951 split windshield 356 Cabriolet.

After the announcement of the emissions scandal, Volkswagen is fumbling to figure out how to pick up the broken pieces of its brand image. Volkswagen had ruined the trust of all of its stakeholders. The announcement of the cheated emissions test has crushed Volkswagen’s stock price by almost 20%, which implies an almost $27 billion loss in market value. This scandal required the recall of 11 million cars with an expected cost of over $25 billion in penalty fees and the cost to fix recalled vehicles. This scandal of much higher than stated emissions directly contradicted with Volkswagen’s branding of a clean emission diesel vehicle. It could not have gotten much counter-intuitive. Volkswagen has spent 45% of its television advertising budget directly focusing on Volkswagen’s products’ low emissions. That marketing budget is now valueless. However, most importantly, Volkswagen upset its customer base. The owners of these recalled vehicles not only feel lied to and betrayed, they have to take time to bring their recalled car in to get fixed. But, one of the biggest complaints is the loss of resale value totalling nearly $5000. This may disrupt repeat customers and