War Is A Mere Continuation Of Policy

In his writing, he stated that war is intrinsically vast, communal (or political) and violent. It is an actual, widespread and deliberate armed conflict between political communities, motivated by a sharp disagreement over governance” (p.135)

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

One of Clausewitz’s many famous theories is that ‘war is merely a continuation of policy by other means.’ This theory is proven correct once again

In order to test this hypothesis properly, multiple steps and measures needed to be taken to ensure the data procured was not only accurate but also pertinent to the study. The first of these steps was to establish a standardized definition of what actually determines what is and what is not an interstate war. In this study, an interstate war is classified as being a conflict between two or more states in which at least one thousand battlefield deaths occur. It should also be noted that at least one hundred of these deaths must be incurred by each state that is participating in the conflict. This helps to differentiate war from other violent acts such as massacres or genocides.

Charles Tilly’s article “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” creates an analogy between the creation of European states and acting out an organized crime. Earlier in our course, we learned about Max Weber, who defined a state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Tilly argues that the word “protection” in relation to physical force has positive and negative connotations, leading to illegitimate use of power during the period time that Tilly is discussing. Tilly’s analysis eventually tells the reader that war is always a major part of state politics; specifically that war making and state making are interdependent.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

Most national assets were focused on contributing to the conflict, but some of the public and political opinions of certain individuals in the government prevented these wars from being coined as “absolute.” During World War II, industrial productivity increased, men were drafted into the armed forces, and all types of jobs in the country were focused towards winning the war. There also was a clear and hard objective that was being fought for, and the purpose of the war was widely known. In the 21st century, countries fight much more limited wars, with fewer resources, less people, and a smaller amount of emphasis of the objective of the fight. For example, take the Gulf War. The intention behind the fight was to change Suddam Hussein’s behavior, or even overthrow his government.2 The military objective was completed swiftly, but the overall goal of changing the government did not happen. The condition that was being imposed upon Hussein’s regime was not being fulfilled. General Rupert Smith commented that this was not satisfied because the military had no strategic goals after occupying the state. The initiative is transferred to the people once military occupation is present, and it is up to them to determine their future society. This new fighting style differs from traditional “total war” fighting styles, in that, these limited wars may not have support of the people, one vital part of Clausewitz’s trinity. Although all wars have

To developed the war theory, Clausewitz used the Dialectic approach, which is a method of philosophical argument that involves contradictory process between opposing ideas to establish the truth, propounded by the German philosopher G W F Hegel. His “thesis” on war is an ‘absolute war." According to him total or absolute war carry out with the ‘utmost violence ' for unlimited aims, and there is no ‘logic limit’ to the application of available all power. On total war both warring fraction could not suspend their ‘military operation’ and ‘hostilities’ until one or other side finally defeated, or ‘fully discharge’ His "antithesis" is historical evidence and his own experience of war. By interaction between these thesis and antithesis, Clausewitz develops Synthesis (theory of war).

The concept of ‘status quo’ is one of maintenance of distribution of power at any given point in time and the preservation of such. The term is derived from ‘status quo ante bellum’ which refers to maintaining the peace treaties and settlements that stabilized the region since the last general war. Thus status quo is about keeping things the way it is, its motive is to preserve and not necessarily gain, boast or heavily influence any new positions that may break the balance. To apply it in current times and specifically to the new and less known form of war- unconventional terrorist war

“War may sometimes be a necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always an evil, never a good. We will not learn how to live together in peace by killing each other’s children. This famous quote is from James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., who served as the 39th President of the United States. It implies that war can be justified under strict circumstances where it can be necessary, but it is still abhorrent. War is defined as a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. Justification refers to the action of showing something to be right or reasonable. War brings many negative and catastrophic impacts not just to the country, but to the people living in the country as well, which this paper

The comprehension of the term ‘total war’ has had great significance towards the understanding as to how wars are fought, affect society and differ from other conflicts. The main issue that arises is conclusively defining total war and is continually differing between both historians and military combatants alike. Roger Chickering defines states “total war is distinguished by its intensity and extent. Theatres of operation span the globe; the scale of the battle is practically limitless” all the while adding “total war requires the mobilisation not only of armed forced but also of whole populations” This definition, while not quintessential is a good starting point for a definition due to its broadness and acceptance of the idea of the incapability to fully mobilise a society’s entire resource. David A. Bell states that it is often defined as ‘a war involving the complete mobilization of a society’s resources to achieve the absolute destruction of an enemy, with all distinction erased between combatants and non-combatants’ . However, he notes the limitations of such an idea including the inability for societies to meet such criterion, in particular, the ability for a society to completely utilise its resources towards the war effort. Ultimately, Jeremey black, while not giving a conclusive definition for the term, total war, does acknowledge different definitions by various individuals distilling many of their arguments and consequently outlining main characteristics of

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.

When extended to the state level, this concept of forcefully acquiring goods and land leads to vicious wars at the expense of a meaningful life for the persons living in the conflicting states. Human rights and social justice are ignored, and in these states there is “no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; … And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” During wartime, a state is only concerned with the concept of winning or ensuring that the opposing side does not win. Life within the state is no longer worth living considering the people’s interests are not being represented. Competition for things without laws or control creates an environment of free will in which the stakes are continually raised higher until there is nothing left of the state to exist; therefore, an overarching power of law such as a sovereign must be put into effect to manifest the significance of defining what is right versus wrong.