The American “way of war” is primarily based on the American interpretation of the national fundamentals and values to include capitalism and basic freedoms surrounding financial enterprising as applied in the democratic system. Along with these ideals concerning free marketing and democracy, the American “way of war” seeks to reinforce alliances with nations that uphold similar concepts and values through international trade and commerce. In doing so, the United States intrinsically denounces political ideologies that are contradictory, such as communism.
In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.
Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of
The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.
From the earliest recorded history, humans have waged war upon one another. To conquer and expand their empires, military leaders have experimented with hundreds upon hundreds of tactics and theories about how to wage these wars. The United States Army has refined and crafted the science of warfare and the art of leadership, designing six ‘warfighting functions’ that interrelate with each other. These warfighting functions shape the way an United States Army Officer plans for combat. The six warfighting functions are Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The use of these functions can be directly related to the success of many victories the United States has seen, not only on the War level, but also for specific battles. In researching the Siege of Yorktown, it is clear to see that these warfighting functions were key to the victory of the siege. This decisive victory legitimized the then freshly founded United States of America.
Strategy is the name of the game, and in Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War, the U.S strategies and policies used throughout history are revisited. Weigley’s focus on the historic strategies of American warfare starts as early as 1775 This book is arranged in different sections depending on the location and strategy, not really sequential in some cases. Weigley went very in depth with his work and made his book a fun read and understandable. He also gave a very detailed amount of historic American military past. To wrap it up, The American Way of War was overall very enjoyable.
In order to gain a thorough understanding of Operation Eagle Claw, it is imperative to account for the historical context which governed the military at the time. Induced by public opinion and the economic state of the United States proceeding the Vietnam War, dramatic reductions in appropriations and personnel plagued the Department of Defense. Consequently, in the midst of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the United States military was labeled as a “hollow force;” the cuts made to federal defense spending compromised the capabilities of most components of the military including the Special Operation Force, which proved to be critical to the rescue mission. Considering the unsatisfactory state of readiness, the disastrous conclusion of Operation Eagle Claw was inevitable. However, despite its tactical shortcomings, the operation has left a reclusive legacy as a constructive failure that catalyzed improvements to future implementations of Joint Task Forces in special operations.
The American Army 's history, composition, and structure predisposed the leadership to a rigid fixation on conventional warfare. In contrast to the British army-as-force-projection model, the American Army found its first task a matter of national survival. This historical trend - the continued perception of the Army fighting a war of annihilation - helped in many ways to keep the Army purely focused on its military objectives. Unconditional surrender was the name of the game, and smaller political goals were seen at best as derivative to, and at worst, preventative of the fabled 'total victory '. The varied composition of personnel which make up the US army also ensured a degree of formality, and a deference to rank. The structure, born of open-combat wars at large scale, was constituted around large divisions, which often rotated officers and manpower in and out. In short, everything within the Army was organized -rigidly- around the principle of a large scale conventional war. What worked against the Germans would work against the Russians.
In the early morning hours of the 19th of March 2003 the leviathan force better known as the United States military began an occupation to topple the brutal Saddam Hussein regime. The conflict later known as the Iraq War and dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States, brought together four separate nations to overturn Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist government. The war introduced tactics and strategies of urban warfare, the likes of which have never used by the U.S. military before; and despite President George W. Bush declaration on the 1st of May 2003 abroad the USS Abraham Lincoln, the war was anything but “mission accomplished.” Operation Iraqi Freedom consisted of twenty-one major battles throughout its rough ten-year occupation. Operation Phantom Fury, or better known as the Second Battle of Fallujah, was one of those strategic key battles. Then Major General Richard F. Natonski led the 1st Marine Division through Operation Phantom Fury. I will introduce a brief history of LTG Natonski, the strategic location of the City of Fallujah, and an in-depth critical analysis of the mission command throughout the deadliest battle in the Iraq War.
Does anybody recall Operation Desert Storm when the United States attacked the nation of Iraq? It was a quick and steadfastly triumph directed by the United States Military and their partners. US use of insight from utilization of SIGINT, HUMINT, SIGNINT, and Symbolism airplane perception empowered them to wreck the Iraqi's powers. Having this influence of operational insight played a huge element in the death of the Iraqi powers to in the end considering rout.
According to Article One, Section Eight, Congress has the power “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;” This means that Congress must be consulted before going to war and has the power to not only declare war, but also the power to raise an army and navy, to fund war effort; however, the President, in Article II, is named commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but this does not give him the power to commit armed forces to war.
Undoubtedly, there is an American way of war. Its central themes may be shared with different nations, but the origins, I feel, are uniquely American. Historian Geoffrey Parker contends, and I wholehearted agree, that there are six descriptors defining our military characteristics. They are: organization, discipline, morale, initiative, flexibility, and command. In sum, these traits create the bedrock in which the U.S. military operates and fights. I believe the origin of the six previously mentioned traits is our relatively juvenile, when compared to other western nations, American culture. Since our inception, we had to “figure” things out which to lead us to concepts that worked when face with immediate threats. Another distinctive
War and economics have been prevalent nearly since the start of mankind and are still a huge part of the world today. In order to make war effective while staying economically stable one must learn of the art of war, and is why The Art of War by Sun Tzu has been read over and over again by military officials since its creation in 513 BC. Therefore, The Art of War could be seen as an impactful text even in today's society not only militarily but also in economic and political situations.
Van Creveld predicted that armed forces of the world would have to adapt to the frequency of involved conflict. This challenging book was too readily dismissed by some critics as reflecting Van Creveld?s personal proximity to the first intifada against Israel and a classic case of overgeneralization (1991, pg. 25). The massive mechanized assault conducted by an American-led coalition to pry Iraq?s invading force out of Kuwait in 1991 lent credence to those who did not want to contemplate the rise of new modes of combat. ?The Changing Face of War? represents van Creveld?s second attempt to flesh out the developments in military history and the rise of unconventional methods in book-length form.
Sun Tzu, the author of The Art of War, wrote one of the oldest and famous books to be written in history. The Art of War, is a Chinese military treatise that has become more than just for military use, it’s utilized in almost all aspects of today’s world. Businesses, sports, politics, education, and so many more have interpreted The Art of War and used it in their everyday lives. The Art of War portrays fighting as a guide serving a dual purpose, suggesting that strategy is not just useful for fighting but for achieving success in life. There are many quotes by Sun Tzu that relates my personal struggles and accomplishments over the course of my life.