What Blakely Decision Would Affect The Federal Guidelines

In 1966, Gary Duncan was charged in Louisiana with simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years in prison and a three hundred dollar fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but at the time, Louisiana granted jury trials only to cases punishable by execution or imprisonment at hard labor, and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial had not yet been incorporated against the states. Duncan’s request was denied. He was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to sixty days in prison and a ten-dollar fine. Duncan appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, but it declined to hear the case. Duncan then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, asserting that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed his right to a jury trial.

Once the District Court closed the case of sentencing Jones life imprisoned before appeals on a case that could have violated Jones right as a citizen. The Supreme Court reenacts the case by reversing the Government’s firm action of convicting Jones for

Furthermore, throughout sentencing and punishment various legal and non-legal measures have been implemented to ensure that sentences for those convicted are appropriate and effective to enable rehabilitation and reintegration into society and provide the community with a sense of justice and security. The provision of statutory and judicial guidelines means that limits are placed on a judge’s discretion when sentencing, thus ensuring sentencing consistency. These guidelines were established in relation to the case R v. Jurisic (1998). The defendant Jurisic, pleaded guilty to three charges of dangerous driving occasioning in grievous bodily harm. He was found under the influence of cocaine on one of these charges. He was sentences to 18 months home detention, lost his driver’s licence for one year and was put on a good behaviour bond for two years. This was through to be lenient and was appealed by the DPP. The appeal was upheld and the sentence was replaced by two years imprisonment and two years disqualification of his driver’s

Petitioner’s appeal from a denial of that motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeals without any prejudice to relief under the Maryland. The petition for post- conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court; and on appeal the Court of appeals held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution denied petitioner due process of law and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of punishment, not the question of guilt.

In 1976, the United States Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) held that the discretion to impose the death sentence for specific crimes was to be bi-furcated into two separate trials. The first to determine guilt or innocence; the second to determine the aggravating and mitigating factors. The State of Oceana adopted the findings of the U.S. Supreme Court in People v. Wende, 600 P. 2d 1071 (Cal: Supreme Court 1979) In

In the U.S. the “War on Drugs” has been at the forefront of debates and discussion since it was formally declared by President Nixon in 1971. This war continues to have many problematic consequences today, the most notable being mandatory minimum sentencing laws for drug offences. This issue has been extensively researched by Kieran Riley with an article in the Boston University Law Journal titled “Trial by Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine”, Paul Cassell and Erik Luna with a peer-reviewed scholarly article titled “Sense and Sensibility in Mandatory Minimum Sentencing”, and the Families Against Mandatory Minimums organization with a policy report. All of these sources came to the same conclusion, that the many negative aspects of mandatory minimums far outweigh the few positive aspects. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws for drug offenses that unfairly incarcerate people are against the fundamental values of the American criminal justice system and should be repealed.

The court's decision was that it was wrong of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to deny the inmate's right to appeal the case. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the murderer was most likely the husband and not Paul Gregory House (“House v. Bell”). The case decision would cause the denial of habeas corpus to be removed and the case would be instated with the help of the new evidence.

Throughout an 18-hour period on October 26, 1989, the appellant Marc Creighton, a companion Frank Caddedu and the deceased Kimberley Ann Martin consumed a large quantity of alcohol and cocaine. The afternoon of the following day on October 27, the three planned to share a quantity of cocaine at Ms. Martin’s apartment. The evidence and later testimony indicates that all of the members involved are experienced cocaine users. The appellant acquired 3.5 grams (“an eight-ball”) of cocaine; he did not try to determine the quality or potency of the cocaine before injecting it into himself and Frank Caddedu.

The concept of mandatory sentencing is a relatively new idea in the legal field. It was first introduced in 1951 with the Boggs Act, and it made simple marijuana possession a minimum of two to ten years with a $20,000 fine. This was eventually repealed by Congress in 1970, but mandatory sentences came back with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Since then, the scope and presence of mandatory sentencing has only grown, especially mandatory sentences for drug related offenses. Recently, there has been a growing concern over the use and implementation of mandatory minimum sentencing, with many believing it reduces a judge’s ability to give out a sentence that they feel accordingly fits the crime. Many advocates for mandatory

favor. The case had yet again been appealed, and this time the Supreme Court is

1993 recorded the highest number of violent crimes in D.C. during the crack epidemic with 16,888 violent crimes recorded. It is apparent that the increased penalties and stiffer sentences for possession and distribution of crack cocaine did not result in a decrease in violent crime. Violent crime in D.C during the crack epidemic increased despite the imposition of stricter sentencing guidelines. During a subcommittee meeting on crime, terrorism, and homeland security in 2009 Judge Gohmert stated, “This sentencing disparity between powder and crack cocaine raises important public policy issues, on the one hand, because African-Americans comprise the majority of crack cocaine offenders to crack cocaine penalties that resulted in a disproportionate number of African-Americans serving longer sentences than powder cocaine offenders.”

Since the inception of mandatory minimum cocaine laws in 1986 to the advent of the Armstrong case, not a single white offender had been convicted of a crack cocaine offense in federal courts serving Los Angeles and its six surrounding counties. Rather, virtually all white offenders were prosecuted in state court, where they were not subject to that drug’s lengthy mandatory minimum sentences. The impact of the decision to prosecute the black defendants in federal court was significant. In federal court they faced a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 10 years and a maximum of life without parole if convicted of selling more than 50 grams of crack. By contrast, if prosecuted in California state court, the defendants would have received a minimum sentence of three years and a maximum of five years (United States v. Armstrong, 1996).

Since the 1980s drug offenses have increased from nineteen thousand to two hundred sixty five thousand in 2008. For many years now, our jails have been struggling with overcrowding. In 2010, our President Barack Obama, signed the Fair Sentencing Act. The Fair Sentencing Act helps reduce disproportion between the amount of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. The act helps in determining whether a person who is caught with five grams of crack/ powder cocaine, should receive the same sentencing as someone who has one hundred times more than that. According to the National Governor’s Association, forty-six states were faced with a budget deficit. With the implementation of the Fair sentencing Act in place, we can begin to see the reduction in jail overcrowding.

What did the appellate court rule? Did it agree with the trial court (affirm) or disagree (reverse)?

White was shocked to hear that his execution date was drawing closer because White thought that he was in appeal process. Stevenson petition both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court to delay White’s execution because his former attorney missed appeals and the failed to procedures (Death Penalty Information Center, 2015). Mr. White’s case is an example how important an adequate representation in a capital punishment trial is to the defendant’s