What Conditions That Lead To Guerrilla Warfare And Distinguishes Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare?

The political beliefs of both group are the same they both are fighting for what they both believe to be right. ‘Political power comes through the barrel of a gun.” (Mao Zedong) The way

A small country such as North Vietnam was able to win a war against a superpower like the United States of America, through, namely, tactics – such as Guerrilla Warfare -, the ignorance of their enemy, the attitude of the South Vietnamese, as well as a strong leader such as Ho Chi Minh. The Vietnam War was a major conflict (of the Cold War) which lasted from 1959 to 1975 , with US involvement from 1964 to 1973 . US reasons for their involvement in the war was their fear of “The Domino Effect” - or – the US fear that communism would spread to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, making them a major threat to national security. The Fall of Saigon marked the end of the war in 1975.

Did you know, that there were dozens of events that lead up to American Revolutionary War? Well, that question will be answered. These paragraphs will only be about the American Revolutionary War. Enjoy!!

Another similarities seen in both wars, is that the U.S fear the involvement of further U.S enemies, particularly the communists nations, like Russia, and China or Iran supporting the Talibans (particularly the terrorists group called Al-Qaeda).

O’Leary’s defines “guerrilla government” as the actions of career public servants who work against the wishes---either implicitly or explicitly communicated---of their superiors (O’Leary, 2014, pg. ).

The Korean War became known as the birthplace of guerilla warfare. The use of guerilla warfare led to a few crimes committed by U.S. forces against civilians. Without US support, South Korea was defeated and pushed back. The United Nations supported South Korea in the conflict and asked to aid South Korea. Several U.N. countries supplied fighting units, sent military clinic help, and field ambulances. Australia was one of the first to contribute military personnel from all three services. The largest U.N. contributor was the United States, which at a time had over a hundred-thousand personnel deployed in direct combat roles in Korea. By summer, the U.S. joined the war to aid to the South in order to fight communism, causing the U.S. involvement

Instead of working on the techniques, training, and doctrine that took place during the war in Vietnam, they decided to avoid that type of warfare in future encounters. Ricks uses many different types of evidence to back up his claims, including testimonies of Army leaders, and intellectuals who believe that there have not been any real doctrine placed to focus on the type of warfare that was used in Vietnam since the war.

As with much of Latin America, the support for insurgency came from peasants and indigenous communities who had been displaced from their lands by elites (UNDP 2006). The government officially became engaged in counterinsurgency in 1960, following a coup attempt and the establishment of formal revolutionary groups under the URNG umbrella. However, it is noteworthy that during its initial years, instead of large scale guerrilla war, the conflict took the shape of political oppression. It was not until 1966 that there was a clear military counterinsurgency effort (Ball, 1999). Deaths and assassinations per year did not surpass 500 in the first two decades (Ibid). However, during the 80s, this number rose to approximately 18,000 deaths per year (Ibid). Army numbers surpassed 40,000, with the support of 500,000 members of civil patrols, while the URNG had a total of approximately 2,000 soldiers (Keel, 1998). Some scholars have gone as far as suggesting that “guerrilla groups did not have the strength or numbers to pose a serious threat,” and that the war went on for as long as it did merely because it allowed the government to eliminate opposition of all types (Chapman, 2001). The continuation of the war benefitted the two main actors: insurgent groups who wanted to achieve national prominence, and the government, whose power and cruelty was justified as counterinsurgency. Paramilitary groups stood

When we consider the social and technological reasons for the uprising we also have to start thinking about where the uprising started and its significance to the geographical locations of the countries that were affected. When

This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.

Mao Zedong leader of the (CDC) advocated guerrilla fighting which he said is “a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them. And it can only succeed if employed by revolutionaries because it is a political and military style. guerrilla warfare is a way for the Chinese to expel an intruder that has more arms, equipment, and troops. Where the industrial nations stressed such tangible military factors such as arms, logistics and manpower; Mao focused on the intangibles which are time, space and will. Not being able to fight a well- equipped army in the field, Mao avoided battles by giving territory to the

Also, the eventual goal in this conflict was to develop a conventional army. Guerrilla warfare was a defensive battle. It was nigh impossible to capture strategic points from the enemy. Developing a conventional army would let resistive forces capture new territory and forcibly push out the enemy. After years of discipline in the guerrilla army, the people would become well-trained soldiers that could be organized into a more conventional army.

People in marginalized positions established power and privilege during the Cold war and Decolonization through a variety of different tactics such as Guerrilla warfare against larger armies, utilizing women and children for war efforts, employing confrontational non-violent political action or committing “civil disobedience”. One place that emphasized Guerrilla warfare was the Mujahideen in Afghanistan as they were defending Afghanistan from the USSR and communist rule. Using these tactics, they were able to establish their power by affectively beating the soviet army and freeing up their homeland. Another way power was established was the tactic of a “people’s war” by the Vietcong army against the U.S. military in the Vietnam War. The Vietcong

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

Focoism and Communist revolutionary efforts, however, are both based on the use of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Both utilize one of two methods to wage their warfare: by either transforming themselves into conventional forces and defeating their