What Does Clausewitz Mean The Center Of Gravity

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.

From the earliest recorded history, humans have waged war upon one another. To conquer and expand their empires, military leaders have experimented with hundreds upon hundreds of tactics and theories about how to wage these wars. The United States Army has refined and crafted the science of warfare and the art of leadership, designing six ‘warfighting functions’ that interrelate with each other. These warfighting functions shape the way an United States Army Officer plans for combat. The six warfighting functions are Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The use of these functions can be directly related to the success of many victories the United States has seen, not only on the War level, but also for specific battles. In researching the Siege of Yorktown, it is clear to see that these warfighting functions were key to the victory of the siege. This decisive victory legitimized the then freshly founded United States of America.

Comparing and contrasting of military theorists Carl Von Clausewitz and John R. Boyd and how relevant there ideas are in the military today. Both have differing theories on the nature of war, but fundamentally similar in the simplicity and psychology of a very complex environment. Clausewitz’s ideas were more strategic in nature with a focus on a “Trinity” to address the enemy’s center of gravity drawing on his ideas for how and why war exists. While Boyd’s work was more tactical with the development of the OODA loop out maneuver and defeat his adversary in aerial combat. Even though they focused on different ends of the spectrum within the nature of war their theories have paved the way for Marine Corps doctrine and leadership development

Some geographic COCOMs and Combatant Commanders significantly influence U.S. foreign policy in their region which offsets the effectiveness of other instruments of power and sets the perception of military first.

Based on the reading, several M/NATO theater-level adversary Center of gravity (COGs) and critical factors were identified by me. The Center of Gravity, best known for its physical strength, power and resistance. In the early 1941, when his alliance was bolstered with Italy by Hitler, against the operations against the British Eighth Army in Egypt is certainly a graphic episode of a center of gravity (physical strength). The Axis (adversary) objective of taking control of the Suez Canal is certainly another platform of center of gravity (power) that was used. Finally, the endurance during the battle of Gazala Gallop is prime example of the resistance to be defeated by the Allied forces. The adversary center of gravity physical strength

The stalemate of World War I’s Western Front resulted from a situation where leaders experienced and educated in 19th Century tactics and strategy could not reconcile this “predisposition” with the changes to war brought on by technological advances and not due to a mindless adherence to time-honored theories of military thinkers such as Clausewitz. The irony is that the tactical and strategic impasse aside, the various elements of World War I such as economy, political, and nationalism more closely reflected Clausewitz’s supposition of war (“clash of interests”) than the pre-war operational plans penned the generals.

Nature of war which usually remains unchanged irrespective of changes in environment or war. Four elements of nature of war are; ‘greater political nature’, ‘human dimension’, ‘uncertainty’, and final one is ‘contest of wills.’ The trinity of war, Clausewitz 's famous theory, comprises three basic elements of warfare are ‘people; the second commander and his army; and the third the government, ' essential basis for successful military operations. He describes these three tendencies are must be balanced to

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

In keeping with his focus on the military aspects of war, Clausewitz defines the enemy’s center of gravity as the enemy army. He supports this with historical reference to such great military commanders as Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII and Frederick the Great. Clausewitz states, “If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.” (Clausewitz, p. 596) Though he acknowledges other centers of gravity, such as the enemy’s capital and his principal allies, “…the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin.” (Clausewitz, p. 596)

A “crucial enabler” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. III-24) or force generator, critical capabilities (CC) are the inherent functions, activities or events that allow a center of gravity to achieve its specified or implied objectives. Using the Ends-Ways-Means-Risk framework, critical capabilities represent the “Ways” (i.e. methods, tactics or strategies) in which a COG will accomplish its mission. Stated more simply, a CC is something a “center of gravity [can] do to you that puts great fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war “ (Strange & Iron, 2013, p. 7).

Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region,

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

What are centers of gravity? In his seminal work On War, Carl Von Clausewitz (1832) defines Centers of Gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point against which all our energy should be directed” (pp. 595-596). What he meant is debatable, however, one interpretation embraces the notion that a center of gravity is a holistic focal point upon which a strong enough blow could throw the enemy off balance or cause their entire system to collapse (Echevarria, 2003, p. 115). Furthermore, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, (2011) define centers of gravity as “a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (p. xxi). If we combine the three, we can further simplify the definition to be a central source or sources of power necessary to achieve a desired end state (ours or theirs) and upon which focused opposition can prevent freedom or action or eliminate the desire to

I agree that identifying an insurgent group’s Center of Gravity (COG) presents a significant challenge when asymmetrical warfare id concerned. Your example concerning Bin Laden is insightful; many believed that if he could be eliminated, then Al Qaeda would be destroyed. This followed the “cut off the head of the snake” theory focusing on the head of the organization. Even though it was a powerful blow and message struck against the terrorist group, it did not destroy it.