What Is Carl Von Clauseewitz's Influence On The Nature Of War

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

Nature of war which usually remains unchanged irrespective of changes in environment or war. Four elements of nature of war are; ‘greater political nature’, ‘human dimension’, ‘uncertainty’, and final one is ‘contest of wills.’ The trinity of war, Clausewitz 's famous theory, comprises three basic elements of warfare are ‘people; the second commander and his army; and the third the government, ' essential basis for successful military operations. He describes these three tendencies are must be balanced to

The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted

On War is not just a manuscript on of how to understand war; it also provides insight into what Clausewitz thought about the dynamics of human thinking. Similar to what Claxton outlined in Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Clausewitz believed that, “knowledge must be absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” (Clausewitz, p147). In other words, Clausewitz believed knowledge

Grand Strategy and the dimensions of the abovementioned. In reviewing the multiple definitions of strategy, one has to look no further than the United States Air Force for the most compelling understanding, “Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and means to accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk.” The least compelling definition derived from Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini who states; strategy encompassed the whole theater and was “the art of making war upon the map.” Jomini, brilliant as he was, misses the main appreciative aspect of grand strategy in his definition, the ends, ways, and means of strategy and here is where we will focus and clearly define, with examples, why the United States is strategically slipshod. In understanding, how the ends desired create problems for the U.S., we will look at three components of that variable to identify and understand the shortcomings of U.S. grand strategy. They are international relations, power, and nested within both is the theory of

Carl Von Clausewitz is one of the most well known, as well as important, war theorists in our history. Although he has been dead for almost two decades, he still plays a major role in shaping military thinkers around the world. The reason his theory is somehow still relevant is because of its flexibility. He did not prepare for nuclear warfare or cyber warfare, but you can apply his theory to the 21st century. Clausewitz believed in two levels of war and that war was continuous. Clausewitz believed that when one goes to war, they should have an achievable political objective; "war is the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1832).