What Is Searle's Answer To The Mind-Body Problem

In this paper I will present an argument against free will and then I will defend a response to that argument. Free will is defined as having the ability to make our own choices. Some will argue that all of our decisions have already been dictated by our desires therefore we never actually truly make our own choices. The purpose of this paper is to defend the argument that we have free will by attacking the premise that states we have no control over what we desire. I will defeat this premise by showing how one does have control over his/her desires through the idea of self-control. I will then defend my argument against likely rebuttals that state that there is still no way to control our desires proving that we do have free will.

Determinism is a doctrine suggesting that for every event there exist conditions that could cause no alternative event. Free will is a philosophical term describing a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Understandably, the dichotomy between these two concepts is a topic philosophers have debated over for many years. As a result of these debates, a number of alternative philosophical perspectives arguing for the existence of free will, namely libertarianism and compatibilism, have emerged, existing in stark contrast to determinism. In order to ascertain the extent to which free will is compatible with determinism, one must first consider these different approaches to

There are objections that arrises to Ayer’s compatibilist solution. One is the invisible chains of causation objection. It states that all of our actions are constrained by causal laws. Ayer’s response to it is that the causes in both cases of the thief and the kleptomaniac are different. One is constrained while the other is entirely based on caused. Another objection is the all causes necessitate equally objection. It states: “For why should we distinguish, with regard to a person's freedom, between the operations of one sort of cause and those of another? Do not all causes equally

But, since intuition depends on who we are and what we are made of, things that we do not control, free will is not present and with that neither is moral responsibility (Strawson, page 17). Everything we do is based off of what we are made of in terms of our mind and rationale, and what we are made of is a product of external things that we do not control, so it must be true that everything we are, and everything we do, is not determined by our own free will. In order for us to truly have free will, it would require us to be our own creators, products of our own thoughts, which in itself is impossible due to our understanding of human procreation. By no means does this suggest that humans cannot be punished for evil actions, or that humans are being forced to do what they do, but rather that we do not have as much control over what we do in our lives like supporters of free will would believe. Free will is not present, so moral responsibility isn’t, either, for determinism proves to be the argument more worthy belief after comparison to free will. I did not make a free willed decision to title this paper, I did not even make the choice to take this class, for what I have been convinced is humorous, clever or for my own best interests in life as a whole is completely out of my control, and with that so are my

In his paper “Mind and Body Problem”, Jerome Shaffer examines the much discussed view of the relation between mental and physical events. According to this view consideration is given to whether or not mental events can occur in the same place the corresponding physical events occur. In the course of his examination of this view, Shaffer considers one difficulty which arises in connection with it, and concludes that it is insurmountable. Unfortunately, his treatment of what he takes to be the central difficulty with the view in question is seriously defected and my purpose in this paper is to indicate wherein its defects lie.

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

Per the theory, the mind is about mental processes, thought and consciousness. The body is about the physical aspects of the brain-neurons and how the brain is structured. The mind-body problem is about how these two interact. One of the biggest questions in psychology and philosophy concerns the mind/body problem: If they are distinct, then how do they interact? And which of the two is in charge? Many theories have been put forward to explain the relationship between what we call your mind, so defined as the conscious thinking 'you' which experiences your thoughts or spiritual being and your brain, part of your body. However, the most common explanation concerns the question of whether the mind and body are separate entities or the same thing. While asking and recording my responses for this particular exercise a few came up with the choice number 4 which stated, “Nonphysical things cannot casually interact with physical things “ when comparing it , your mind being able to interact with physical things in general was immediately shut down , that it was not possible, that you cannot casually interact , between the mind and the outside world at a whim, with-out some kind of training to understanding the non-physical things

Many times I find myself sitting and wondering whether I am fully free or not. I wake up every single morning and do the same routine, which is eat breakfast, go to class or work, do homework, go to the gym, shower, and then go to bed. Does this truly mean I am free? There are a lot of questions that you can ask yourself while following a routine. Is this really the path I should have taken? Were my choices determined by external factors? Determinism is the thesis that an any instant there is only one physically possible future. Robert Blatchford and Walter Terence Stace, two philosophers, both agree that determinism is true, although they have two different views on whether this means that people are free or not. Blatchford believes that everything is predestined. Stace on the other hand, believes that a person chooses what they do because of free will. In this essay I am going to discuss both of the philosophers’ views more in depth and why I favor Stace’s view over Blatchford’s.

People believe that genuine freedom of choice is not always possible because our decisions and actions are determined by factors beyond our control. This view is known as Determinism. There is also an extreme form of determinism known as ‘hard determinism,’ in which they believe that every demeanor can be traced to a cause, although they may disagree about what those causes are. The idea of determinism poses a difficult issue to the concept of ‘free will’. Are we able to make free choices if all our thoughts and actions are predetermined by our own past and the physical laws of nature? Majority of us would like to believe that we have the freedom of will and are able to make decisions based on our own discretion but, I personally believe that the deterministic view holds true to a certain extent and that most of our actions are a result of a force that is beyond our comprehension. My purpose in this essay is to explain and critically analyze Baron d’Holbach’s view on determinism.

In “Human Freedom and the Self,” Roderick M. Chisholm takes the libertarian stance, arguing that freedom is incompatible with determinism, that determinism is in fact false, and that humans do posses the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. Chisholm argues that a deterministic universe, where all events, including human actions, proceed from prior events without the possibility that they would proceed differently than they do prevent the possibility that humans are responsible for their actions. To validate his libertarian beliefs, Chisholm sets out to prove that humans are responsible for their actions and also the thoughts that lead to those actions. In order to answer this problem, Chisholm believes we must make some assumptions about the man who preforms the act.

Some proponents of free will argue that by choosing to do something, one causes oneself to act. One could have caused oneself to act in another manner, and therefore the act, although caused by that person, is still a free choice. However, that notion is held under scrutiny because a person who acts freely has no evidence that they have acted of his or her own accord. For all one knows, one’s actions and choices could have been causally determined, and although one thought one was acting out of free will, one is not. There is no definite proof to show that one’s choices are made freely. As A.J. Ayer stated in his essay, Freedom and Necessity, “…but from the fact that a man is unaware of the causes of his action, it does not follow that no such causes exist” (Ayer 272). Since there is no way of knowing if one exercises free will, determinism poses a serious threat to the concept of free thinking and free acting human beings.

Miguel de Cervantes once said, that “in order to attain the impossible, one must attempt the absurd.” It would appear that Benjamin Libet took these words to heart when he undertook his free will experiments in the early 1980s. Kornhuber and Deecke first discovered, in 1965, that voluntary physical action is preceded by a measurable change in the electrical activity of the human brain. They dubbed this change “the ‘Bereitschaft-potential’ or ‘readiness potential’ (RP)” (Libet 47). Intrigued, Libet wondered if their discovery could aid him in answering an age old question about the connection between natural laws and free will. Using a modified version of their approach, Libet set out to determine the temporal relationship between RP, conscious will and voluntary physical action. He proposed that by establishing the position of conscious will within this timeline, he could prove that it plays an integral role in bringing voluntary acts to fruition. In this paper, I will argue that Libet’s conclusion must be rejected, as he does not succeed in adequately establishing “the time of the conscious will relative to the onset of the brain process (RP)” (Libet 49). To illustrate this point, I will examine how Libet’s control trials failed to produce a valid margin of error for his experiments. Next, I will discuss how problems inherent in the self-reporting process negatively impacted his results. I will then address how a lack of empirical data undermined his veto theory.

behavior and whether that is an act of freedom or determinism. A question that I propose and

Opposed to Mind-Body Materialism is Mind-Body Dualism, a view which supports that mind and body are not identical, but, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. It denies that the mind is the same of the brain, or a product of the brain, by arguing that the thoughts and the material things are composed of different substances, and the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects: size, shape, location, solidity, motion, etc. According to the Dualism, the soul is comprised of a non-physical substance, while the body is constituted of matter. This view also establishes that mind and body are capable of causally affecting each other, even if they are necessarily not the same thing. When applying this notion the human body, the meaning becomes clearest: the intellect is responsible for all our acts, but it does not imply that the intellect is the brain. For example, before eating a meal, which is a physical action, you probably felt hungry,

Ryle rejects the doctrine that the will is a faculty within the mind, and the doctrine that volitions are mental processes which the human body transforms into physical acts. Ryle explains that this doctrine is an example of the myth that mental acts are distinct from physical acts, and of the myth that there is a mental world which is distinct from the physical world. This doctrine of separation between mind and body is referred to by Ryle as 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine.' Ryle argues that there is no ghostly, invisible entity called 'the mind' inside a mechanical apparatus called 'the body.' The workings of the mind are not an independent mechanism which governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body, but are conceptualized as a way of explaining the actions of the body.