What Is Strategic Bombing And American National Strategy, 1941-1943?

Allied war planners with the vital information about the enemy preparedness for the Russians to

In this essay I will assess the significance of strategic bombing of Germany. I will do this by evaluating four key areas of the German war effort. This will include German and British moral, German economy, its effect on the outcome of the Eastern Front and the results of the preparation for D-Day. Overall allied bombing did not have a significant impact on the outcome of the war as for the majority of the war bombing techniques and technology were primitive and so had little effect. It only became a threatening tool latter on in the war, when the allies had effectively won.

The United States entered World War Two in late 1941, and right away they were thrown into a conflict that involved making important decisions that would affect generations of people, in the United States and elsewhere, for years to come. A most notable decision by the Allies, namely the United States and Great Britain, was the combining of the American and British military chiefs of staff. This joint collaboration was appropriately titled the “Combined Chiefs of Staff”. They worked together as one body, and made war planning decisions and strategized together. This type of alliance was an innovation in war planning for the time, and the decisions made collaboratively by the two powers contributed greatly to the Allied victory in 1945. The relationships involved and the disputes that came up are worth noting, specifically the question of the Allies opening up a second front in the west, particularly titled “Operation Sledgehammer”. The relationship between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, as well as General George Marshall of the United States and General Sir Alan Brooke of Great Britain were the main actors involved in this undertaking, and they will be the main individuals discussed and analyzed for the purposes of this paper. Ultimately Operation Sledgehammer was delayed and no action was taken upon it. Even though it caused rifts between the USSR, for reasons that will be explained, and the Allies far into the future, in retrospect they may have been

It is heavily debated that the display of German aggression inevitably contributed to the outbreak of general European tensions, and war in 1914. The use of strategies such as the Anglo-German Naval Race, as stated in Joll’s source, highlighted the aggression by Germany prior to war. Moreover, this type of tactic also demonstrated the desire and hunger Germany obtained for continental power, another factor towards European tensions. The sources in question both support and contest the set statement, to an extent. Sources 1 and 3 by Corrigan and Joll, respectively, argue how Germany’s use of tactics agitated European powers, thus causing war. However, Source 2 by Turner disagrees with the statement, arguing how other European powers were to

Richard Overy’s book “Why the Allies Won” is a great read for those who are intrigued by World War II alternate histories. Overy gives unique insights on the large scaled picture regarding how the war went throughout each of his chapters. The book identifies that the resulting Allied victory was not inevitable, and then it points out the factors that contributed to making the Allied victory possible.

* Analysis of the role played by American troops in the Second Battle of the Marne and subsequent engagements with the Germans

The book effectively builds context for the Pacific War, discussing the political and military background from both American and Japanese perspectives. Nonetheless, Spector does not reveal any new information. Corroborating evidence in this piece serves the purpose of summation rather than radically modifying current academic perceptions of World War II, but Spector makes choices in his writing that certainly challenge cultural mindsets surrounding the war. Rather than categorically highlighting successes of the Americans while neglecting the strengths of the Japanese, Spector unambiguously discusses strengths and weaknesses for all actors throughout the conflict. In fact, he criticizes American exceptionalism in his description of the two-pronged advance by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, contending “…the adoption of this course of action was less due to strategic wisdom than to the army and navy’s reluctance to entrust their forces to the command of an officer of the rival service” (p. xiii). The facts that Spector cites throughout Eagle Against the Sun do not divert from other historical texts analyzing the war. Rather, Spector’s ideological interpretation of these facts reflects his distinct purpose to convey the truths of the Pacific War while filtering

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

This mission command analysis evaluates the battle of Team Desobry at the town of Noville, Belgium. These events took place 18-19 December 1944, and later impacted the battle fought at Bastogne during World War II. It is the goal of this review to discuss and analyze three mission command principles displayed during this battle: Create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, and the acceptance of prudent risk. One of the main characters that took part in this story was the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division. The commanding officer of this element was Major William R. Desobry. During the events of World War II, the German forces were trying to gain control of the Ardennes to cut off the allies’ supply lines in order to isolate British forces from the American troops. A pivotal task for German forces to attain this goal was to gain access and take control of the Belgian town of Bastogne. However, an important strategic stepping stone to get there was Noville, which is just seven kilometers northeast of Bastogne. Two main reasons made Noville such a critical location for the Germans: First, it had a junction of roads that were important for displacement of German forces to the West. Second, it provided an alternative road to access Bastogne from the north.1

Leading into the Fall of 1914, tactics on both sides of the line involved the rapid mobilization, maneuver and envelopment of the opposing side.10 Pre-1914 doctrine took little into account the effects of emerging new technology and their impact on both defensive and offensive operations. This disconnect between doctrine and technology contributed to the failure of early offensive operations in the Fall of 1914 and resulted in staggering casualties.11 Both sides developed doctrine that took into effect the unique terrain and technology that had been developed prior and during World War I. However by the end of the war, a combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system the most effective.12 This “elastic defense” had three unique characteristics; dedicated counter-attack force at all levels, decentralized command and control, fluid defensive belts and integrated artillery support at the Division level. Under this new doctrine, Corps headquarters had the role sustaining subordinate units, but not directing their actions during battle.13 This defense-in-depth and the lessons learned during the Verdun battles of 1918 were so successful that British forces adopted many of the German tactics with a special emphasis on their counterattack capability.10 Utilizing the new doctrine, by August 1918, Germany had made substantial gains, however had

The state of America’s military forces at the outset of World War II can be summed up in one word: unprepared. Certainly that is the case witnessed on many levels at the attack at Pearl Harbor. Sailors rested on Sunday morning, unprepared for the sneak attack; commanders were off ship, enjoying golf or a leisurely breakfast, completely caught off-guard when the bombs fell; and the fleet itself was unprepared, with most of its ships at anchor in the harbor, making relatively easy targets for Japanese bombers. Descriptions of being caught unaware dominate personal narratives of that day and the days that followed, both from those who experienced the events, and from political and military leaders across the ocean back in the states.

Strategic bombing is considered one necessity for a nation’s air force to visualize air supremacy during World War I and World War II. Strategic bombing is defined as “striking deep into enemy territory to destroy war-making capabilities.”

The Schlieffen Plan is commonly – though misleadingy – identified with the German western offensive at the start of the First World War in August 1914, which began as a campaign of rapid movement but ended in deadlock and trench warfare. The plan is generally seen as a desperate gamble almost certain to fail, and its recklessness is counted as part of Germany’s war guilt – the plan held out the false promise of a quick victory, and so it underpinned the “short war illusion” that led Germany into a long war of attrition, ending with her defeat and collapse in 1918. This analysis confuses two quite different moments in history. The Schlieffen Plan was not designed to meet the strategic challenge Germany faced in 1914,

Because Hitler’s vision did not translate into an effective strategic plan, with clear strategic objectives a disconnect between what Germany wanted to achieve (ends), the way it wanted to achieve it (ways), and the resources it would choose to utilize (means) was created. As such, it is this disconnection that also played a large role in Germany’s failure to translate its tactical and operational victories into strategic success and overall victory. Examples of this disconnect and the calamitous effects are clearly present in a quick analysis of the Battle of Britain.