What Is Sustainment In The Military

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Army leaders must balance the link between the Army’s culture and it’s climate and institutional practices. When there is a proper balance it has a huge impact on the mindset of the Army’s Soldiers. Their actions or inactions impacts the five key attributes of the profession, and the four fields of expertise, and have long term effects on the Army’s culture and climate. These actions influence Soldiers’ perceptions that they are serving professional who have answered the call of service to the republic, it is important that Soldiers understand that their role is a calling and not just a job.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

The Army has two different sustainment doctrines and systems for  "contiguous" and "non-continguous" battlefield deployment scenarios.

In July of 2003, 1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery was notified to prepare for a twelve month rotation to Afghanistan (Armstrong et al., 2003). The intent was to send two brigade combat teams to rotate after six months in Afghanistan. In typical “Need to Know” fashion, 1-62 ADA was notified that they will be sent to Iraq early August (Armstrong et al., 2003). This is the first time the entire division deployed since the Vietnam War. Battalion staff began planning for several operational deployments for two different theaters. 1-62 ADA Soldiers were engaged in the Global War on Terror, combating Taliban rebel fighters in Afghanistan, and battling insurgents in Iraq (Armstrong et al.,

If the Soldier in question had been issued these items, his/her leadership should counsel on the importance of accountability and require the Soldier to purchase the items as a replacement. I could not find a regulation stating it is acceptable for leadership to require certain brands be purchased. The Soldier should only be required to purchase the standard issue items, and should also be given adequate time to save for the expenses. In this situation, one pay period is likely adequate due to the low cost of the items in

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

Your superiors will order inspections to see that soldiers have all the equipment and clothing issued to

I believe you hit the proverbial nail on the head. After the initial invasion it didn’t take long and the sustainment routes were set up. I do believe they were very successful. I would also like to add that I think that they work well most of the time. However, I do fear that the army as a whole has lost a lot of ability to sustain its self wile on the move in an ever-changing battlefield. I fear the Army sustainment operations over the last 10 years have been one of readymade processes that were set up by solders that are no longer in the army.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

Army sustainment is based on an integrated process (people, systems, materiel, health services, and other support) indivisibly linking sustainment to operations. The concept focuses on building a combat ready Army, delivering it to the combatant commander (CCDR) as part of the joint force, and sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area and with unrelenting endurance (ADRP 4-0, Chap. 1, Intro.) Sustainment maintenance is off-system component repair and/or end item repair and return to the supply system or by exception to the owning unit, performed by national level maintenance providers. National level maintenance providers include the Army

The purpose of Army maintenance is to preserve the required performance capabilities of Army materiel or to return those assets to their baseline performance capabilities. Maintenance is an enabling process to meeting Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements. ARFORGEN is the process used to generate and regenerate combat power and preserve the capital investment of combat systems and equipment to enable training and mission accomplishment (Department of the Army, 2013). The Army’s doctrinal definition can be confusing to some and it does not make mention of efficiency, reducing non-value adding activities and the overall equipment effectiveness. This definition allow for commanders at all levels the flexibility to focus on other tasks, tasks not related to maintenance.

Enduring high operational tempo requirements are increasing force management risk through decreased readiness, morale and retention of JF 2025. In essence, protracted operational requirements of campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are reducing reset and reconstitution dwell times significantly straining (suicide, divorce) the JF and increasing near to mid-term risk to the All-Volunteer Force.24 Near to mid-term risk mitigation encompasses, DoD’s vigilance to service member and family wellness assessments ensuring stability, resiliency, health and overall wellness of JF 2025. 25 Presently, sustained combat and contingency operations are not considered an eminent long-term risk, however ongoing operations exhibit potential to increase veterans