What Is The Military End-State?

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

Bush, asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), multiple Iraqi human rights violations stemming from the WMDs, and the suspected Iraqi support for al-Qa’ida, who had been previously chased out of Afghanistan. After the initial invasion, however, U.S.-led Coalition Forces were unable to locate any significant evidence of WMDs. Back in the U.S., investigative committees subsequently concluded that Iraq possessed no WMDs and did not harbor any connections to terrorist organizations. Moreover, Hussein had been successful at evading capture despite an intensive manhunt, and U.S. forces seemingly were unable to play a domestic security role, further leading to the dissolution of Iraqi security services and ushering in widespread looting and disorder. This highlighted that the invasion of Iraq was not be an easy victory as originally surmised. Since that time, many scholars have focused on the effects of the Iraq War, speculating on the Bush Administration’s motives for the decision. While some within scholarly circles have attributed the invasion of Iraq to groupthink, a theory that has recently become a staple in understanding foreign policy disasters, there is little literature that has been applied to the rationality of the decision to invade and whether groupthink influenced the decision-making process. Therefore, this paper will seek to examine the decision to launch the invasion of Iraq and the clearly failed planning for the occupation of the

The function of the military forces for the United States has had no choice but to evolve as wars wax and wane. As the rise of militant terrorist groups became a threat to the United States and its allies, the armed forces of the United States were deployed by the President to countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Instability in these countries threatened bordering allies, and after September 11, 2001, the threat was brought to U.S. soil. Each president from Clinton to Obama has had to shape the policy of how the armed forces fit into civil-military policies abroad and overseas. In a war time environment, such as Iraq, the purpose of how the military should be deployed is easier to clearly state. But in times when there is no imminent threat, it is much more difficult to transition

The Gulf War is often remembered as an easy victory by most Americans. Perceived as an intense military campaign intended to bring about a swift victory, and often referred to as a battle between good and evil. In reality, the U.S. military had a host of troubles in the conflicts of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Sheild which became known as the Gulf War of 1990-91, many of troubles were caused by the unnecessary deaths of allied troops, and the Iraqi civilians alike. Other catastrophes were avoided purely by luck or incompetence of the Iraqi Military. What new military strategies, procedures and technologies are now in place as a result of lessons learned. Hopefully to ensure that some of the worst mistakes that were made evident by the Gulf War will not be repeated in a subsequent war in Iraq or elsewhere. The intense reality of the actual battle fought by the United States and its allies against Iraq, left many a U.S. military spokesmen were scoffing at the Iraqi forces as “the fourth-largest army in the world.” And “the second-largest army in Iraq” by the world at the end of the Gulf War,

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

Greene cites Bush’s major foreign policy success as his international leadership for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. He engineers a near unanimous vote, including the Soviets, of support in the United Nations. Bush also clearly articulates America’s purpose for the first Gulf War in his National Security Directive 54 (p. 127). His concise directive provided military commanders with finite, attainable missions to accomplish, leaving little ambiguity, contributing greatly to the success of the

Greene cites Bush’s major foreign policy success as his international leadership for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. He engineers a near unanimous vote, including the Soviets, of support in the United Nations. Bush also clearly articulates America’s purpose for the first Gulf War in his National Security Directive 54 (p. 127). His concise directive provided military commanders with finite,

This paper will look at and discuss the presidency’s actions involving Iraq from Reagan to Obama. Each and every president during this time has used different strategies and formats to get their agenda across, to not only convince the public, but the international community as well. We will show how Iraq has gone from an ally to overthrowing the government, to the ensuing turmoil that this created for everyone involved, from ours and their citizenship, governing bodies, and other world leaders. With over 35 years of intervention, we will determine if there has been a consensus of actions among our presidents, and see if there is a cohesive US strategy and long term goals that have been reached for all our effort and actions to all of this.

President Obama’s strategic plan in Iraq and Syria is to continue Airstrikes to slow the forward progression of ISIS, while utilizing deployed U.S. service members to work with coalition partners to assist with partner building capacities. These partners include “Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and moderate Syrian fighters, and both Sunni and Shia militia groups.”3 To be successful in this endear as mentioned by Sec Carter, “the only way to have a lasting defeat of ISIL is to have someone who can govern and secure territory once ISIL is defeated, a local force on the ground. That 's why the strategy calls for the United States to help train and equip, and then help enable local ground forces.”4 Without basic security the Government of Iraq (GOI)

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

In 2003, President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell launched an invasion of the nation of Iraq. United States Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined the reasons Iraq posed a threat to international security in a speech he gave at the United Nations. Iraq’s nuclear weapons program concerned the Bush administration. Fearing Iraq might use this program to act aggressively in the region, and wanting to secure oil supplies and a friendly regime, the administration pursued a plan of action to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power (FLS 2016, 43). A constant secure supply of oil stood as a cornerstone of the military-industrial complex thriving in the United States and a friendly regime in such an oil rich country remained an important objective of President Bush. This directly conflicted with the desire of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to remain in power.

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution