On October 18th 2017 one engineer and one electrician were continuing work on decommissioning two relays of a three relay differential protection relaying scheme in preparation for installation of a new relay to be used a replacement for the three. The protection scheme used the three differential relays for bus protection during different main and transfer bus utilization scenarios. Two weeks prior, October 4th, preliminary work began on removal of the relays from service. The goal of the day’s work on October 4th was to shift all differential protection to 87B63 while decommissioning 87B62 and 87B61 relays. To decommission these two relays the CT’s from PCB3652 and PCB3552 were shorted at the PCB’s in the field. Both PCB’s were open …show more content…
The electrician doing the removal examined the wiring from the switch and noted to the engineer that it was CT wiring. It was distinguished that it was one of the two CT circuits coming from 3652, one which was shorted and one that was not. The one that was not shorted was previously daisy chained from relay to relay in the previous protection scheme and work on that circuit was thought to be all removed two weeks prior when the engineer was on site for decommissioning. The cabinet in the field was examined and the cables were noted which CT was and what CT was not shorted. Upon returning to the control room the CT cable running to the test switch was determined incorrectly by the engineer to be the shorted CT and the A phase circuit was cut and opened by the electrician. Upon cutting of the wire the circuit was instantly noted to be live by the nature of the “buzzing” of the cut wire. North dispatch desk was contacted to see if PCB3652 could be opened so that the circuit may be examined safely while saving possible damage to the CT’s on PCB3652. When PCB3652 was opened the “buzzing” stopped further confirming the wrong circuit was opened. With the breaker open the cable was examined in the field and it was noted that where the cable came out of the conduit in the panel that the wire had burned the insulating jacket off. The circuit that was opened was a remaining leg of a daisy chain that supplied current for differential
I confirmed with the SDG&E technician that the power was never interrupted to suite #150 he just removed the burnt meter and bypassed the meter socket.
b. Rationale for your decision: Tom will not be covered because he works for an independent contractor (Eagle Electrical Company). Eagle Electrical Company should be responsible for Tom’s compensation coverage not the local business where he became injured.
The analysis of DTL and the energy sector will provide an overview of the sector and the decision categories that team members are responsible for safeguarding DTL Power. Also, this section describes the dependence the energy sector has on cyberspace; as well as the threats and vulnerabilities that it may suffer. Additionally, defensive and
In round two of the simulation, an attack on DTL Power left services down for hours last Wednesday. The cyber-attack left residential, business, and government customers in the dark for hours. During the forensic investigation, evidence revealed that the cause of the attack was a worm intrusion that caused a reduction in DTL system functions. This reduction in system functions resulted in an excessive amount of downtime. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DTL?s system was compromised. Cyberterrorism tools such as port scanners were found in our system. These tools were not detected prior to the investigation.
Sam also monitored the state of the bulb, as I went to vacate the premises and had everyone exit through the main entrance. I call 911 around 9:28 a.m. giving the order to the operator to send the fire department, along with providing the operator with full description of what was occurring. After making sure everyone was out of the building I went back into the multipurpose. Upon entering the multipurpose room I found that the whole bulb had fallen to the ground in flames and instructor Yarbaugh was putting the fire out with the fire extinguisher, while instructor Sam was opening the bay door, while that was happing the fire department had arrived shortly after putting the fire out. The fire department turned the H1 electrical unit power off to prevent any further electrical fire. The fire fighters that was on the scene gave the orders to leave the power off until a licensed electrician comes and checks out the electrical unit. The electrician arrived about 11 a.m., he was able to single out that particular unit the bulb was receiving power from, and eliminated the power from that unit. The electrician then restored the power to the rest of the build around 11:30 am which allowed the companies to reenter the facility allowing them to proceed with their
When the gasket failed, water from the fire suppression system drenched valuable MRI equipment located inside the room, the room began to flood, and some of the water penetrated a concreate slab into the clinical engineering shops in the basement level below.
The first problem that was raised was the negligence. If no evidence was found LLC would have been cleared, but the fact that there was evidence that LLC has communicated with KK Glass with safety procedures proves negligence by not providing proper approval of the safety gear. It could have been avoided by not assigning a LLC superintendent. The second problem that arose was the general contractor’s responsibility to ensure safety. The responsibility shifted in the indemnification process from the subcontractor to the general contractor because LLC proposed their own method of safety when using a bosun. This could have been avoided by allowing KK Glass maintain their own safety procedures. Since witnesses were not present, it breaks down that LLC was considered to a proximate cause of Harrison’s death. Overall, a lot of damage could have been avoided with either avoiding the problem in the beginning by stating things similar to that LLC will not be conducting personal safety precautions and it will be the sub-contractor’s
On May 21st at 0715 EST, Assistant Security Supervisor Sterling Carpenter and Security Officer were posted at 1025 Thomas Jefferson st NW, when S/O Davis stated that she was feeling numb and mild pain in her chest.A/S Carpenter asked S/O Davis would should be able to finish her schedule shift, S/O Davis responded she strongly doubt it. At 0718 EST A/S Carpenter called Global Operations Center , Operator Amanda Bennett received the call. A/S Carpenter stated that S/O Davis wanted to driver herself to the local hospital, GOC declined that option, and instructed A/S Carpenter to call 911 and request medical crew. At 0720 EST A/S Carpenter contacted 911, after explaining S/O Davis symptoms , the 911 operator required A/S Carpenter to perform several
Security was notified by F'C- Simone and Dinning room manage of the cooling tower back firing and sparking. S/L Walker was enroute from PV-5 floor. S/O EMT Brock was enroute from MG. S/O EMT Cunningham was enroute from CB4. Finally, S/O EMT Wertman responded with 501 to give a hand. S/O EMT Brock and S/O EMT Cunningham arrived on the scene 2 minutes before S/L Walker and S/O EMT Wertman. S/L Walker had The three officer check the boiler room gauge. The cooling tower had not backfire for about 15 minutes of S/L Walker being there. After it started again but it was ones every 10 minutes. S/L Walker did not see any sparks, but just heard the backfire. Engineering was called to come out. S/L Walker informed and kept Andrew Janosko in the loop of
Yesterday, at approximately 1 pm three employees were removing a cantilever I-beam used to shore up balconies on level 9. The I-Beam was placed onto dollies and was manually pushed across the level 8 deck from the south elevation to the Preston deck located on the north elevation to be removed by the crane. During this operation one of the dollies got caught up on a small 8” hole cover, this caused the I-beam to jump and shift when this occurred it pinched the right middle finger of one of the employees. The employee was taken to the hospital where he was treated for lacerations, separated nail bed and a fractured finger tip. The employee had surgery last night to repair the fingertip. The employee was discharged from the hospital around 11
Due to problems uncovered in the investigation it became painfully apparent that forms documentation is a problem in the mishap squadron. The following discrepancies were noted in aircraft XXXX’s forms: Job Control Number (JCN) 091730256 “main fuel strainer disconnected”, the reason for removal was not annotated (i.e. leaking, removed to Facilitate Other Maintenance (FOM), no follow on leak check was annotated or referenced, the Main Fuel Shutoff Valve (MFSOV) Circuit Breaker (CB) being pulled was not annotated or referenced, also no warning tags being installed were annotated or referenced. Investigation disclosed that the engine removal template was also flawed (which is approved by QA); the template did not mention the removal of the main fuel strainer at all, and this was acknowledged during maintenance interviews. The SIB also noticed several improperly documented In Progress Inspections
On Thursday 12/7/17 at 15:00, Company employees are on location at 47-55, 37th street for a plumbers meet to discuss a service swing over from a 1952 - 3” steel service to a new 2017 4” PE service. While on location Energy Services employees smell gas and call in a gas leak. GDS responds to location and conducts a leak investigation. GDS receives Type 1 gas readings and seals around the inside foundation wall of 47-55, 37th Street to zero out the gas readings. Queens ERF crews are dispatched and arrive on location. The ERF crew reviews the leak ticket with the GDS mechanic and proceed to call for a tow truck to move vehicles that are parked over the main. A second ERF crew is also dispatched to location to assist in repairing the leak.
John Schmidt, an employee of HDR Architecture Inc., was injured on June 7th approximately at 1:18pm. While in the production shop, John critically wounded his hand by pushing a chunk of wood through the blades on the table saw. John is filing a dispute with HDR Architecture Inc. proclaiming that the table saw was hazardous for employee usage. The shop manager, David Donald, and the shop foreman, Harry Hiller, claim the table saw followed every safety procedures and meets the maintenance requirements. The shop manager also claims, if the table saw happen to be unsafe for usage, the shop foreman would have alerted him of the issue. The shop foreman indicated, he observed the victim goofing around by the machinery. However, another colleague of the victim said, the table saw was because the safety guard was poorly designed and didn’t function correctly. The table saw was frequently tested for maintenance upkeep, but that poorly design safety guard was never corrected. The department of Health and Safety inspected the table saw and found the safety guard was unquestionably poorly designed and unsafe.
To further my understanding and professional credentialing in Power Distribution System Protection I am pursuing an Associate in Applied Science at Richmond Community College (RCC). I am enrolled in the Electric Utility Substation and Relay Technology (A50510) program. My short term goal is to secure entry level employment as a Relay Technician with an Original Engineering and Manufacturer (OEM), a large public Utility, or a contract field service agency. My long term goal is to offer contract commissioning and relay field service through my own corporation.
The 44kV entrance supply can be overhead or underground. Normally this supply is first connected to the MUS pole for MUS connection and then to the HV switch & fuse structure via overhead conductors. There are three mid-span openers installed in between the MUS pole and the HV Switch &fuse structure for station isolation, when MUS is connected. Additionally, power distribution throughout the station is carried out by direct buried, underground cables connecting every electrical component, having concrete vaults under LV load break interrupter, reclosers, and station service transformer. The LV cables are connected to equipment bushings via dead-break elbow connectors, which require to be disconnected only when not under load.