What Role Can And Should Intuitions Play? Moral Theory?

Hobbes and Kant both give a different account of the foundations of morality. Drawing from Hobbes’ Leviathan and Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, I will compare their understanding of the foundations of morality. I will discuss the conflicting accounts of the role played by reason versus the role played by desire and inclination in the determination of what is good, evil, right or wrong. Hobbes claims that ordinary experiences establish human beings as self-interested and are driven by desire or aversion and that is why morality is grounded by subjective self-interests. On the other hand, Kant provides a purely rational principle for ordinary views about unconditional moral value, morality has a universal law that applies to all rational beings at all times. The following paper will identify and explain the key points and sources of difference between Hobbes and Kant. First, I will explain both understandings of morality. Second, I will describe how the account of the foundations of morality differs in human nature, rationality and conceptions of morality. I will, in conclusion, argue that Hobbes’ account of morality best works with our ordinary experiences and moral convictions.

In this reading by Gazzaniga: “Toward a Universal Ethics”, we are presented with The Trolley Dilemma. The dilemma in abstract moral reasoning studies most often presented by researchers is the trolley problem. This is an experiment in ethics and moral justice. A situation built on abstract moral reasoning. The question here is “Are morals something that is innate or are they something we learn?”

What is morality? Where does our sense of morality come from and why is it important for us to know? The cognitive scientist, psychologist, linguist, and scholar, Steven Pinker discusses this in his essay, “The Moral Instinct”. In this essay, Pinker claims that our morality sense is innate, it constantly changes, and it is universal among each culture. Pinker also explains that moral sense shapes our judgement as it is something that we value and seek in other people. The science of the moral sense is important since it shows how morality impacts our actions and it explains why we act in certain ways.

I infer several conclusions from Smith’s definition and analysis of sympathy. First, sympathy is a mode of perception. The “eye of the mind” or the imagination perceives the situation witch elicits primary sentiments and secondary agreeable or disagreeable sentiments which are the basis of moral judgement. Secondly, I conclude from Smith’s propositions that the mind is a passive recipient, therefore moral knowledge is a by-product of external stimuli. In other words our external sense stimuli provoke a change in our minds, from which our imaginations produce sentiments by which we judge the propriety or merit of another’s conduct.

When thinking about morality, it is necessary to consider how aspects from both nature and nurture, along with free will, may form ones moral beliefs and dictate ones moral actions. To understand how moral beliefs as well as actions formulate and operate within individuals and societies, it is imperative that a general definition of morality is laid out. Morality, then, can be defined as ones principles regarding what is right and wrong, good or bad. Although an individual may hold moral beliefs, it is not always the case that moral actions follow. Therefore, in this essay I aim to provide an explanation that clarifies the two and in doing so I also hope to further the notion that one’s moral framework is a product of all three factors; nature, nurture, and free will. The first part of this essay will flush out what exactly morality it and how it manifests similarly across individuals and differently across individuals. Contrariwise, I will then explain how morality manifests similarly across societies and differently across societies. Alongside presenting the information in this order, I will trace morality back to primordial times to showcase how morality has evolved and developed since then, not only from a nature-based standpoint, but also from a

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

In The Moral Instinct, Steven Pinker cites Haidt’s “primary colors” of the moral sense (329). Pinker believes that all moral decisions can be categorized with these primary colors and, though everyone can see these colors, they are prioritized differently by different people. Haidt identifies five primaries—harm, fairness, community, authority, and purity—all of which make up the moral spectrum. These recurring moral themes can be found everywhere from cultural norms to the decisions and beliefs of individuals. Though the themes can be identified in works regarding ethics and morality, they—if applied correctly—can also give insight into the way the author prioritizes the moral colors.

It does not, however, accept that we would need a special perception or intuition that does not exist in order to understand these features. Non-naturalists embrace the idea of ethical intuitionism, the belief that we learn about moral properties through direct observation (Ridge). The second half of the “Argument from Queerness” provides non-naturalists with another objection to error theory. Mackie claims that if moral truths did exist, they would have to be intrinsically overridingly motivational. He bases this idea of strong motivational internalism on Plato’s Form of the Good. The notion that moral truths must be overridingly motivational is an extreme interpretation that is not widely accepted. Instead, non-naturalists make a case for weak motivational internalism; this understanding “allows that even though the person who makes a sincere moral judgment will feel some motivation to comply with it, that motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires and defeated by a variety of mental maladies” (Rosati). Weak motivational internalism accounts for those who make moral judgments but do not abide by them. Another way to explain these individuals is to deny the idea that beliefs must be motivational altogether, and instead propose a

It communicates in different ways to each of us. Following are some of the ways intuition makes itself known. Emotions - Intuitive information often comes through our feelings or emotions. Our feelings are neither good or bad, they are simply messages to guide us in life. Linda Kohanov has wrote extensively about the emotional intelligence of horses and what we as humans can learn from them in her books.

Have you ever asked yourself where your conscience comes from? The feeling that takes a hold of you when you do what you feel is wrong. This feeling is almost like a consequence when you tell a lie or commit a crime. Your conscience helps you sort out the good and bad and feels your mind with sorrow when you see a sad story on the news or gives you the initiative to donate money to a contribution. But where does it come from. Is it something you are naturally born with, taught over time or given to you by a higher power? This argument leads to the existence of moral values by many philosophers including William Lane Craig. One of his excerpts argues that if there is an existence of moral values, which some people agree,

The Key Contributions of Intuitionism to an Understanding of Ethics The ethical theory of intuitionism basically states that what is morally right is already known to us. Intuitionism says that "good" is an indefinable notion. The basic moral truths are objective; they hold independently of what anyone may think or feel. Therefore we should pick out our moral principles by following our basic moral intuitions.

I agree with Audi because the beauty of moral knowledge is that it is different for everyone yet somehow for many it is quite similar even if they’re generations apart or worlds apart. Moral knowledge may come from an idea, like the idea of hitting an innocent dog is absolutely horrible and no one should ever hurt a dog no matter what by simply just thinking about it or through previous ideas with empirical evidence, such as past observations, basically like rationalism.

So, in regard to our intuition, do we know it when we have experienced it? Do we recognize when "intuition" has been a factor in our behaviors, our choices or our actions?

Are statements in morality simply expressions of approvals or disapprovals, as suggested by emotivists, or are they certain kinds of universal prescriptions, as what R.M. Hare has pointed out (Hare, The Language of Morals, p.163-179)? While nearly all moral theories cannot avoid counter-examples and conflicts between duties, it seems that moral knowledge is not possible. In this essay, with reference to John Rawls's conception of reflective equilibrium, I argue that moral knowledge is indeed possible under a coherentist model, without accepting that there are no universal moral standards as what non-cognitivists suggest.

Responding to the smile of a baby, jumping-up when startled by a sudden sound, or even pulling your hand away from a hot fire are all examples of instinctive behaviour; instinct does not involve thought but is an automatic, evolutionary response to external stimuli. Instinctive judgements are more intuitive in nature but though related, in terms of both not involving conscious thought, instinct and intuition are not the same. Intuition is based on subconscious thought; a pattern recognized by the brain based on, for instance, past experiences, whereas instinctive judgements appear to be independent of experience or rational thought. As a student of psychology, I like to make the distinction that instinct is a behavioural process while intuition is a cognitive, but subconscious, process. The term ‘judgement’ used in the above TOKstatement implies taking an objective or considered decision based on instinct alone rather than on conscious, rational thought. I believe the absence of conscious