Why Might a Business Firm Pursue Other Objectives Besides the Objective of Maximum Profits? What Objectives Other Than Profit Maximisation Might a Firm Pursue? Is This Possible in a Competitive World?

I essentially wanted to be an efficient company that could maintain a steadily increasing Share Holder Value with as few expenditures as possible, and it seemed to be working for a while. I also wanted to have a higher number of sales as it seemed the more sales I had, the less customers the competition had to sell to keeping their sales down a little bit.

In addition, firms may want to profit maximise and gain supernormal profits because it would attract potential competitors to join their market. This is because companies such as apple, gain too much supernormal profit, it attracts other firms, such as Samsung and Orange, to join their market and share their supernormal profits. So companies may want to sacrifice their profits in the short run to prevent unwanted competitors in joining their market in order to gain supernormal profits in the long run. However this only occurs in imperfect competition because most firms only make supernormal profits in the short run and normal profits in the long run. Also a non- maximising behaviour by a firm is usually disciplined by competition in the capital market rather by competition in the goods or products market. In the capital market, if the shareholders aren’t happy with the firm’s behaviour of non profit maximising, they would sell their shares and, if a firm’s level of profits is too low, the owners may sell their business to a new owner. This would then mean managers may want to

There are three internal and one external governance mechanisms used for owners to govern managers to ensure they comply with their responsibility to satisfy stakeholders and shareholder’s needs. First, ownership concentration is stated as the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of the shares they own (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 317). Second, the board of directors which are elected by the shareholders. Their primary duty is to act in the owner’s best interest and to monitor and control the businesses top-level managers (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 319). Third, is the

When the firm is trying to maximize their stock they are trying to develop new products and technology which leads to producing products that the customer (society) needs.

In this situation, the manager will try to increase profits as much as possible, meaning they may: • Select accounting methods that maximise profit instead of ones that better reflect the firm’s current position such as using a different depreciation method, accelerating revenue recognition or changing the level of depreciation. Try to manipulate accounting figures. Adopting a short-term focus instead of a long-term one. In this perspective, PAT is siding towards regulation. The Agency Costs of Equity One part of residual agency problems is the agency cost of equity. This is because managers’ shirking (they become less productive because they see no need to work for no extra pay) and conflicts with outside equity interests reduce the value of the firm. To minimise this, monitoring and bonding costs are required to implement measures to minimise its detrimental effect on the value of the firm. It must be noted that no firm will completely eliminate this as costs will increase exponentially as one tries to eradicate more and more. Thus, there is an optimal trade-off point between monitoring costs and agency costs. This is where the marginal monitoring and bonding cost equals the marginal shirk. The Agency Costs of Debt Much like the agency cost of equity, there is also one from debt. This is due to the fact that managers will always try to shift wealth from debt to equity holders. Managers have their stake in the firm’s equity and

Managers and shareholders are the utmost contributors of these conflicts, hence affecting the entire structural organization of a company, its managerial system and eventually to the company's societal responsibility. A corporation is well organized with stipulated division of responsibilities among the arms of the organizational structure, shareholders, directors, managers and corporate officers. However, conflicts between managers in most firms and shareholders have brought about agency problems. Shares and their trade have seen many companies rise to big investments. Shareholders keep the companies running

In order for any business to be successful they would need to know how to make the most profit for the goods they are producing and selling.

In large corporations the success or failure of the company is the responsibility of the board of directors. According to Richard DeGeorge, “The members of the board are responsible to the shareholders for the selection of honest, effective managers, and especially for the selection for the CEO and of the president of the corporation.” (p. 202). The board members have a moral responsibility to ensure the corporation is run honestly, in respect to its major policies, and to ensure the interests of the shareholders are satisfied. The next responsibility within a corporation is the responsibility management has to its board of directors. DeGeorge writes, “It must inform the board of its actions, the decisions it makes or the decisions to be made, the financial condition of the firm, its successes and failures, and the like.” (p. 202). The management of the corporation is morally obligated to

The article by Thomas Cassidy, points out the instrumental role that greed plays in the modern corporation. Modern Economists have always seen greed as not only a necessary element in the corporate environment, but as also a vital part of the successful evolution of a public company. As the article points out, “Economists from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman have seen greed as an inevitable and, in some ways, desirable feature of capitalism. In a well regulated and well balanced economy, greed helps to keep the system expanding”.

The first section of this essay focuses on the possible causes of corporate failures including dominant CEO, poor strategy decision and the failure of internal control. Secondly, it discusses how the third edition of corporate governance principles and recommendations could be applied to prevent the causes of the failure. The 1st, 2nd, and 7th principles along with specific recommendations will be mentioned in this section. However, the context is concerned solely with the causes stemming from Dick Smith itself.

The ASX Corporate Governance Council defines the ‘corporate governance’ as the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled within corporations (Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 2014). The term “failure” of a corporate can be described as “Insolvency” in Australia (Michaela Rankin, 2012). And the reasons for corporate failure can be grouped into six categories: 1. Poor strategic decisions. 2. Greed and the desire for power. 3. Overexpansion and ill-judged acquisitions. 4. Dominant CEOs. 5. Failure of internal controls 6. Ineffective boards(Michaela Rankin, 2012).

The most important shortcoming of the firm is the management or the managers who failed to amend the paramount goal of the company. Yes, it is reasonable to focus on profit maximization for the first few years of the business but keeping that as overruling per se for 20years isn’t healthy at all. The shareholders are the true owners of the business and the ones bearing the most risks, let alone being the principals who are the residual claimants. Maximizing shareholders’ wealth should always be one of the top priorities for not only their resources run the business but the means concerning the

The executives are accountable to the board of directors. Instead of protecting the investors, the board enticed the culture of financial fraud in the company for selfish gains. It failed in its duties in keeping the executives in check.

Throughout history there have been many successful companies as well as companies that have been a debacle. The success of the company has to do with the management and how it executes its strategy. If the management is ineffective, the company will most likely fail; however, if the company has good management it is more likely to prosper. There are many responsibilities that a manager must complete, chief among them are the four functions of management are planning, organizing, leading, and controlling (PowerPoint). In order for the company to be successful the management must fulfill all four functions. In some case not all four functions are met to expectation, with the results that the company to be not as successful as it could be if they

One often stumbles upon such statements while reading about shareholders value or maximization of shareholders wealth. This is also a typical answer to questions such as “what is the best and primary objective of a company in a competitive market”. But should it be the only and most important objective in a firm? Must it be fulfilled first and foremost, or is there the possibility of generating more wealth for company, shareholders and stakeholders with other, different approaches? It has