Why Realism Fails Counterinsurgency?

Theoretically, it holds that the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan as a self-defense strategy following the 9/11 attacks. Practically, however, as US foreign policy is about conquest, self-protection and resource-extraction, it seeks strategic dominance of geographical space to sustain its global relevance. The rationality of the US suggests the need to continuously accumulate capital, resources and military proficiency to ensure autonomy. Therefore, a pragmatic reading into the motivation behind the invasion of Afghanistan negates the self-defense theory. Rather, the shifting coordinates of power within central and southern Asia crafted the perfect criteria for US intervention. This work explores the motivations and systemic cover-ups designed by the Bush administration in ordering military troops into Afghanistan in 2001. It will hold that this invasion was not just a War on Terror, but rather a tactic to ensure US prevalence within the region, and henceforth, the rest of the world. Thus, why did the US invade Afghanistan?

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Foreign and domestic policies are not linear, rather the policies are connected in a circle, with each policy reinforcing the values of another. Domestic American terrorism in the prison and detention systems and governmental reforms are influenced by the mobilization and ethnocentrism abroad. The militarization internationally is justified by the domestic handling of the same cultural issues within the United State borders. The United States has strangely used a near Catch-22 to handle dilemmas. The United States has allowed perspective to become reality, whether with oneself or regarding issues abroad, specifically in the Middle East. Terrorism is the use or threat of fear for political or economical gain. An internal characteristic of terrorism is how dependent it is of perspective, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. To understand “terrorism,” a focus must be applied to the history, what drove an organization to commit such acts. Respectively, the Middle East has been a hotbed for the key word “terrorism,” especially because of 9/11. Subsequently, Muslims have been stigmatized by the United States as terrorists. The consequences spawned because of 9/11 require a look to the past to understand the present.

The book “How Terrorism End; Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns”, written in 2011 at the height of Al-Qaeda, the most well-known international terrorist group of our time. The author of this work, Audrey Cronin, at the time of print, served as a professor of strategy at the United States National War College in Washington D.C., and a senior associate at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Program. Both positions allowed her to impact strategic policy making in the execution of the Global War on Terror by allowing her access to senior military and civilian policymakers. Her previous area of her prior work has been mainly focused on international terrorism with an emphasis on al-Qaeda. She has authored

The practical application of the defence power in an age of terrorism is difficult to determine, as it is reliant upon a set of circumstances that can have a plethora of different interpretations from a range of variant perspectives. Unlike some other powers, the defence power is purposive and elastic; it waxes and wanes, and its application “depends upon the facts, and as those facts change so may its actual operation as a power”[1]. Recent developments, such as the Thomas case, have led some theorists to comment that “the elastic of the defence power has become stretched all out of proportion”[2]. In its present interpretation, the defence

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

Hanson’s 2012 premise, albeit over two years old today, is immediately discernible: America faces devastating self-inflicted wounds by implementing the current Administration’s defense spending budget. The dawn of 2014 finds this debate ongoing and the implementation of this budget well in progress, with even more drastic cuts taking effect than the ones analyzed by Hanson previously. While few historians of repute would argue against the reality that the siren song of defense reductions has lured the nation onto the shoals of unpreparedness for future conflict many times in the past, two shortcomings in Hanson’s piece beckon us to pause and reexamine.

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

There are, however, aspects that disqualify the realism theory in examining the War in Afghanistan. For example, realism explicitly applies to relations between nations and consequently, war between countries. This was not the case, since the war did and still does not involve conflict between America and Afghanistan. Rather the war was between America and the Taliban government that supported the infamous terror group, al Qaeda. For this reason, realist theory does not explain this highly controversial war. Another aspect that contravenes realism as an appropriate theoretical approach to understanding the War in Afghanistan is that fact that, America toppled the Taliban government within its first few months of the invasion. Realism cannot, as a result, explain why American troops and those of allied forces have not yet been pulled out of Afghanistan more than a decade after war started (Bird and Marshall 37).

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

“War on terror is a misnomer. It would be like calling America’s involvement in World War II a “war on kamikazism.” Terrorism, like kamikazism, is a tactic,” Dinesh D’Souza, an Indian public speaker once noted. It goes without saying that terrorist actions do not appear suddenly, by someone’s unexpected insight. Actually, terrorism is a tactic that is built on the solid fundament of its inner complex philosophy. There are certainly a number of reasons for terrorism to live so long and escape diminishing, and these reasons, when adequately understood, first of all, and only then properly treated, may make the scale of terrorism reduce visibility. That is only a hypothesis, but this is clearly an issue worth of careful attention which does not close up in leading a war against terrorism. As D’Souza has remarkably specified, “this word combination has been already a kind of foolish”. In short,

Certainly, it seems that advocates of COIN recognized how the U.S. fell back on the arborescent methods of conventional warfare. Long before Petraeus took command in Iraq he had argued that members of the American Army had a tendency “to invent for [themselves] a comfortable vision of war, a theater with battlefields [they] know, conflicts that fit [their] understanding of strategy and tactics.” Conversely, COIN is far more cognizant of the nature of

Conventional warfare that is prolonged and resource intensive is not sustainable and eventually leads to descent into attrition type warfare. Irregular warfare operations, be it COIN or counter-terrorism, from the Western perspective consume time and resources. This consumption is predominantly fuelled by the asymmetry of Western and insurgent forces which results in significantly different tactics being used by the two forces. Western powers, in almost all cases, tend to have superior technology and a larger number of forces and rely heavily on these factors during conflicts, however this perceived imbalance of power is not necessarily advantageous for the Western power. Andrew Mack discusses this idea that military superiority does not always result in victory when facing an unconventional enemy, Mack states " In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat." Here Mack surfaces the idea of 'political capital' and argues that insurgents' ability to win wars stems from "...the progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war." This concept is solidified if we observe the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, after having a Western military presence in the nation for over ten years, public support has declined and it is no longer politically viable to continue operations in that theatre. Insurgents continue to function in this state and the threat of

As a direct consequence of September 11, a number of substantial challenges lie ahead in the area of counter-terrorism..   The most prominent of these is the changing nature of the terrorism phenomenon.  In past years, when terrorism was largely the product of direct state sponsorship, policymakers were able to diminish prospects for the United States becoming a target using a combination of diplomatic and military instruments to deter potential state sponsors.  Today, however, many terrorist organizations and individuals act independently from former and present state sponsors, shifting to other sources of support, including the development of transnational networks.

The first tenet of COIN aligns with the first two statements of COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. The primary focus is on the people and earning their trust. The people function as the internal intelligence for the government and support the goal of eliminating, harboring and providing safe havens for the enemy. This effort is supported by the United States Soldiers and its allies taking up residence in the community with the Afghanistan people. This also reinforces President Obama core element of a civilian surge to reinforce positive action. It is imperative to get the people out in the public view and not living in fear. Constant and daily interaction is essential in gathering local intelligence on what is going in the government in hopes of understanding how the people feel and think about their leadership. Communication is helpful but being a good listener is an invaluable asset to information gathering. Secondly, the United States military goal is to support the fostering of renewed trust of the Afghanistan people in their government and security forces. The ultimate goal is that the Afghanistan people reject the insurgents and stop them from infiltrating their infrastructure. This approach was taught by