Why The United States Should Negotiate A Separate Section 123 And 1 Alliance And Hold The Iri

1752 WordsApr 28, 20178 Pages
OPTION 1: Continue to support the P5+1 Alliance and hold the IRI to strict accountability of all provisions outlined in the JCPOA. Utilizing public diplomacy, communicate that violations to the JCPOA will be seen as cause for the U.S. to seek an exit from the JCPOA. Make clear that significant violations would also introduce all instruments of statecraft to deter Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. If the IRI continues to meet its obligations, and prior to the expiration of JCPOA enrichment limitations, the U.S. should attempt to negotiate a separate Section 123 like agreement with the IRI. The proposed bilateral agreement will further restrict any future enrichment activities to levels deemed acceptable by the U.S. As an…show more content…
exits the JCPOA while simultaneously increasing unilateral targeted sanctions against the IRI. The U.S. deters Iran’s use of a nuclear weapon by proposing, negotiating, and entering a formal mutual defense alliance with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other key partner nations. Use the newly created Gulf Defense Alliance (GDA) as the vehicle to extended nuclear deterrence. Offer a separate bilateral alliance with Israel, extending the same level of deterrence provided to the GDA. By means of the newly created alliances, execute deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. Engage in public and private diplomacy with the P5+1 partners to attempt to alleviate any potential concerns regarding any perceived threats to their security interests. Attempt to make clear the altruistic purpose of the newly established missile defense posture in the region. Persuade all GDA members to join the U.S.

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