In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, he discusses and develops his view on the nature and relation of the world, fact, atomic fact, object, simplicity and complexity. Wittgenstein starts with asserting what the world is, and then builds each concept. In this paper, I will expound upon each concept and what I believe he is expressing with each one. “The world,” he claims, “is everything that is the case… [it] is the totality of facts, not of things,” (Ogden translation, 1-1.1). Things are existing in the world, but they do not tell us anything about the world. Facts tell us about the objects (or things), their properties, and their relation to each other. The totality of these facts make up the world and determine both what is and what is not …show more content…
He says, “If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context. The thing is independent, in so far as it can occur in all possible circumstances, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with the atomic fact, a form of dependence,” (2.0122). With this, he is asserting that objects have the possibility to be apart of one another, composing atomic facts, but are not necessarily limited their possibilities. I think of this as it can both be possible and true that my keys are on the dining room table, or hanging by the door, or in my purse. All of these are possibilities and true at different points in time. He then goes on to say that objects have their own, specific properties and contain all possibilities of these properties, or state of affairs (2.0131-14). However, objects are simple and form the substance of the world, which without, we could not form a picture of the world; any complex statement or proposition can be broken down and analyzed by their parts (2.02-0212). To put simply, without having a foundation with which to build complex ideas and atomic facts, we could not think about the world because we would have nothing to base our thought on. Furthermore, he states that objects are fixed and therefore there is a fixed form of the world (2.026). I do not
some more properties emerge. One of these can be identified as the simplicity of truth
“For by Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities--all things have been created through Him and for Him.”
"While we have discussed what both men see as the make up of the material world, it is equally important to take up how each man felt he could know what he knows about the universe. Mimicking a bit the structure of Parmenides? own writings, this section
This relates to multiple aspects of reality, because we can group things into categories of which that can be observed and listed. Though with the above context is based on our mental ability and we may not “really know.” Skepticism appears to be the root of this dialogue.
In the Word of God exist the eternal truths, the species, the formal principles of things, which are the models of created beings. In the intellectual light imparted to us by the Word of God we know both the eternal truths and the ideas of real beings. God is the beginning and end of enerything.
created the heavens and the earth.” This means there was nothing to this world until He created
The argument Renatus intends to make with this ideology is that every effect must contain the same properties as its cause, and vice versa (41). This point is the precursor to his first proof of the existence of God. The understanding is that a rock could not have been a rock unless the forces, by which it was created, also contained the qualities of a rock (41). Alternatively, as much as a substance can only exist as a result of something of equal perfection, for an idea to be derived from a cause different from its effect, the idea would have been created from nothingness. Therefore, because an idea is not (nor cannot be) nothing, it must always be the case that reality follows this cause and effect relationship (41).
Kim’s essential argument relies on two different metaphysical principles. Firstly, he presents the ‘Casual Individuation of Kinds’ principle that states that kinds in science are individuated on the
We are small living particles in a big universe (4). The enumeratio of "soil, trees, cities, inhabitants," are concrete nouns that the natural aspects of cultures and communities as a whole, tying them to the natural cycle, where once one dies, there is another living, and so forth (4). The intentional vagueness of the noun clause "whatever they may be" demonstrates the unknown cultures within the countries (5). The first verb "be" The enumeration of "splendid suns, the moons and rings" illustrates the many appearances of nature in the universe, that is known (6). The ever-changing "countless combinations" of the limitless knowledge that is known about cultures and unknown, differentiating as the world changes (6).
Since Plato, two mutually exclusive yet essential categories of reality have been posited, one of concrete particulars and the other being abstract universals. Particulars are “unproblematic,” but universals may be entirely extant in many positions with no influence on the universal itself. A particular “distinguishing mark is that is exhausted in the one embodiment, or occasion, or example.” (Campbell 298) Particulars are unproblematic because they are restricted to a single point at any given time, not like universals which exist in different locations and are wholly present in those instances. The number of examples which contain the abstract universals are not diminished in quality of the universal. Campbell posits that this “problem” can be alleviated if properties were not universal at all. There is a distinction between abstract and concrete which differs from the distinction between universals and particulars. This is because particulars and universals can both be abstract where only particulars can be concrete. The particulars that
In this essay I will argue D’Hollbach’s argument on that everything is pre-determined, and that there is no free will at all, just pre-arranged determinates. I will argue and show what points and flaws D’Hollbach has with his arguments on hard determinism.
Besides, it does not necessarily exist, but merely just something one can think of, then if that was the case, isn’t it likely to be something still greater than that a thing which would be just like it? In addition, in this particular instance, would it not be conceivable to be something one able to see or exist in real life which contradicted the initial assumption. we are supposed to think of something that was at the limit of greatness, which nothing greater can be conceived, but then we thought something still greater than some of the thing that actually existed. In my view, one must reject the assumption of the thing which nothing greater can be conceived which also necessarily exists, not just something in the mind, but also exist in reality. That’s pretty much the entire argument he was trying to make.
While David Lewis’s essay “New Work for a Theory of Universals” (1983) is quite extensive in its scope and insight, I only wish to draw attention to his reasoning about the scope of universals. Lewis makes a more radical distinction between “property” and “universal” than most philosophers. Lewis defines the word “property” very broadly: an object has a property by virtue of being a member of a set, so there are as many properties as there are sets. Given that Lewis is a realist about both set theory and possible worlds, he must recognize a vast and exotic array of properties. There is a property of fuzzy redness and non-square largeness as much as there is a property of redness, both being sets. Obviously not everything that is designated a property can claim the status of universal. Only those properties that can be wholly present in multiple locations are candidates for being universals. Among these, those given by empirical science (natural properties) make the final cut and are crowned as universals.
The connections between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Soren Kierkegaard as philosophers are not at all immediately obvious. On the surface, Wittgenstein deals with matters concerning the incorrect use of philosophical language and Kierkegaard focuses almost exclusively on answering the question 'how to become a Christian'. But this account belies deeper structural similarities between these men's important works. Thus, this paper suggests that their methods, rather than exclusively content, contain a strong parallel on which a natural and hopefully fruitful examination of their work can be based.
There are many objections to the picture theory of meaning and unfortunately a large number of these are due to misinterpretations of the Tractatus. Because The Tractatus is such a complex and cryptic book, and because Wittgenstein can be quite vague in his explanations, readers interpret it in many different ways and take different meanings from it and so objections and also defenses can be based on underlying misconceptions. In "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language", David Keyt remarks that it is difficult to see how Wittgenstein meets some of the common objections to his Picture Theory. Because of this it is difficult to examine the strengths of the Picture Theory, and this extends to the Tractatus as a whole. (p ) He argues that