Zombie Argument

I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and

The first premise has some major issues if we refer back to our objections to the argument from essence. We came to the conclusion that

The zombie argument presents an idea meant to prove that consciousness doesn’t necessarily logically supervene on the physical. In this example there exists a zombie, defined as “someone or something physically identical to me ( or any other conscious being) but lacking conscious experiences altogether.” (Chalmers,94) Zombie world is then defined as “a world physically identical to ours,but in which there are no conscious experiences at all. In such a world, everyone is a zombie.” (Chalmers, 94) In this idea, only “phenomenal zombies” are to be considered meaning zombies that are “physically and functionally identical ( as us) , but which lack experience” (Chalmers 95) There are five main arguments that stand behind this idea, the first two being ideas regarding conceivability, the second two arguments of epistemology and the fifth and argument of analysis.

In this paper, I will examine the principal merits and challenges of René Descartes’ concept of dualism and then defend my preferred alternative among the options Paul M. Churchland discusses. After briefly defining Cartesian Dualism, I will show that its principal merits are that it is consistent with common sense and that it is able to explain phenomena that appear mental in nature. Next, I will show that its principal challenges are its failure to adequately explain how the mind and the body can causally interact, and its failure to respond to the observation that brain damage impairs the mind. Finally, I will explain why Functionalism is the best alternative to Cartesian Dualism.

It doesn’t even get digested. Zombies are the undead; they don’t have blood pumping through their bodies, or even oxygen. They have no need to eat, but I can tell you personally, they want to. I seem to be a special exception to the rule however. I can think. I’m by all rights dead, a zombie in everyway, I cannot talk, I decompose, I moan horrendously, but I know exactly what I’m doing. It disgusts me, but I know what it is I’m doing. Other zombies seem to be unaware of my prowess, although we cannot talk to each other directly, we can interpret each-others moans, and understand each other. It’s one of the key reasons why zombies don’t eat each other, aside from our general dislike for dead flesh.

The distinction of so-called “hard” and “easy” problems demonstrates the fallacy of any argument lacking more in-depth inquiry and reasoning (i.e., ignorance). The argument based upon such ignorance in the “hard problem” is such that the mysterious nature of consciousness is derived from an ill-defined concept that in reality is more question-begging than conclusive. Churchland believes that consciousness must be explained through empirical possibilities, not logical possibilities. Much of the argument from ignorance relies on thought problems relating to possibility; and then thought-experiments that rely on a degree of guesswork and, reflection, simply because of scientific limitations at any given time. For instance, in the zombie argument people are told to imagine the human brain as identical to a zombie, yet different in qualia.

The terms zombie voters can be defined in many ways. Zombie voters are people that don't vote at all , those that vote for candidate for no particular reason other than gender race and because it's a tradition to their family. Even though I disagree

The majority of objections raised against Olson’s argument, though, come in light of premise 2 and its implications. The motivation for premise (2) of Olson’s argument, that if there’s a human animal located exactly where you are, it is thinking, is very straightforward. Olson states that if the human animal can have the capacity of maintaining a functional nervous system, then it must be thinking. One specific objection to this premise is the example of the human zombie. This example posits a human zombie that is identical to a human in every way possible, except that it is not thinking. Olson finds this argument irrelevant to the world we live in. He replies by stating that in our normal world, in which hypothetical human zombies do not exist, there is no reason why a human animal with a fully functional nervous system would not be thinking. Another defense of premise (2) compares humans to less advanced animal. This defense of premise (2) runs as follows: (1) Less advanced animals can think (e.g., apes, dogs); (3) If they can think, then human animals can think; (3) So, human animals can think.

When looking at ICON before discussion for Public Health on Friday and seeing an activity called zombies, I was a bit taken back. I was not sure where this discussion was going to go or what topic it could be covering. I was excited, yet confused on for what was to come within lecture. Zombies actually turned out to be a fun twist on an informative activity.

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

In 1983 Jerry Fodor opened the introduction to his new research of “Modularity of mind” with the phrase; “Behavior is organized, but the organization of behavior is merely derivative”. This meaning that behaviors are simply imitations, never original nor created. Fodor created a theory of how the mind was structured and how would perform. He studied the architecture of mind in modules; a term that will describe that the mind had different specific structures that had precise purposes. Jesse J. Prinz just like Fodor was a philosopher who was in opposition of the “Modularity of the mind” theory. This essay will have as a purpose to create an argument on the explanation and disagreement that Prinz wrote cluster by cluster against the theory “Modularity of mind” in an article called “Is the mind really modular?”

The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as René Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but different properties. However, although Nagel illustrates the problems with Descartes= theory, Nagel=s theory runs into the problem of panpsychism. In this paper, both arguments will be discussed to determine which, if either, side is stronger.

Zombies are becoming an increasingly popular component of movie culture and are one of the most commonly spoken and written about fictional creatures. Consequently, zombies are often portrayed as mindless, violent creatures with a demand for human flesh. In each text their distinct features can differ, but there are many common ways their origins are described. Some of these are:

Zombies are organisms in human form that possess extensive damages and abnormalities to the brain due to the exposure in a “zombie virus”. Zombies can be categorized as an infectious disease or sickness that can be transmitted very easily through a bite or through the air that we breathe. Timothy Verstynen a neuroscientist and a professor of psychology defined zombies as a disorder called consciousness deficit hypoactivity disorder or CDHD “which is the loss of rational, voluntary and conscious behavior…inability to coordinate motor or linguistic behavior” (s1). Through the virus, zombies acquire behaviors like “hyper aggression, memory deficits, movement dysfunction, language disruptions, and visual recognition impairments”(S1). These behaviors

Descartes discusses the existence of the human mind as a separate entity from the human body, including the a passage confirming his own existence as nothing but a thinking entity, in his writing Principles of Philosophy (I. 63-65). Following his rejection of all knowledge, in order to divide what was false from what could be proven, Descartes strives to prove the existence of his own mind, as a basis from which to prove the existence of the rest of the universe. I think his premise is flawed, Through the concept of doubt, he finds a contradiction (I am thinking about not