“the First World War Did Not Arise Primarily as a Result of Planned German Aggression” How Far Do You Agree with This Opinion?

The Schlieffen Plan was a German battle plan to fight a two front war devised in 1905 by Alfred von Schlieffen as the Chief of the General Staff for Germany. The plan called for the German army to apply overwhelming force in France to capture the capital of Paris within six weeks before changing focus to Russia. The plan intended to achieve a quick and decisive victory by sweeping a line of armies through neutral Belgium and into France. In actuality, Helmuth von Moltke made significant changes to Schlieffen’s original plan before and during World War I. Ultimately, the plan ended in failure when the German advance halted at the First Battle of the Marne (Limbach, 2014).

Germany and why it has gone through First World War has been subject of debate among scholars, academics and historians. Several documents have been analyzed in order to understand the subject and aims of Germany were when it went on war. Wide ranging literature is available on the subject, which concentrates on discussing the start of World War I. History is based on evaluation and examination of facts. The

The Schlieffen Plan weaknesses were major in comparison to the strengths. Germany had to complete the plan completely as it was planned. In order for it to be successful since their actions depended on that certain things would happen. Therefore it only needed minor mistake to change the success of Germany. Relying on assumptions as they did through the Schlieffen plan ended up having major consequences for Germany and for the following course of First World

The Schlieffen Plan is commonly – though misleadingy – identified with the German western offensive at the start of the First World War in August 1914, which began as a campaign of rapid movement but ended in deadlock and trench warfare. The plan is generally seen as a desperate gamble almost certain to fail, and its recklessness is counted as part of Germany’s war guilt – the plan held out the false promise of a quick victory, and so it underpinned the “short war illusion” that led Germany into a long war of attrition, ending with her defeat and collapse in 1918. This analysis confuses two quite different moments in history. The Schlieffen Plan was not designed to meet the strategic challenge Germany faced in 1914,

‘German aggression was responsible for the outbreak of a general European war in August 1914’. How far do you agree with this judgement?

When Germany declared war on Russia in 1914, they also had their own military plan, which called for a two front war with France and Russia. It was called The Schlieffen Plan and was developed by General Alfred von Schlieffen in 1903 but was revised in December of 1905. At this time, he was chief of the German General Staff, and Europe was separated into the Triple Alliance, which consisted of Germany, Austria, and Italy, on one side and the Triple Entente, which consisted of Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the other. Schlieffen was sought out by the Kaiser in order to construct an arrangement that would allow Germany to

Fischer argues that German imperialism bears the onus for the Great War, as he concluded that they had gone to war to achieve European and worldwide domination. He states that Germany had ‘confidence in the invincibility of her military strength,’ implying that Germany had been building up their forces. This indicates Germany must have already been preparing for war, strengthening her army until she saw that both France and Russia were ‘militarily weak’ in comparison - to the extent that German elites believed they would remain somewhat unhindered in their continuation of ‘aggressive intentions.’ This is significant for several reasons. First, it was controversial as these ideas challenged the pre-existing general consensus of historians’ outlook since the 1930s: that all involved European nations shared a collective war-guilt from the First World War. Fischer rejects this view. He references a document written by Bethmann’s private secretary on 9 September 1914, outlining the Chancellor’s plan for peace negotiations which he anticipated would soon take place, as according to the September Programme. Fischer extrapolated that these detailed plans (that already had the support of the wider political nation in Germany) must have existed in August and July, and that this was indication towards Germany’s

When the war broke out, Schlieffen was no longer chief-of-staff and Helmuth von Moltke took his place. Moltke made a few changes in the original Schlieffen Plan.

Source W tells us "German actions going back to the 1890s had done much to create

The commencement, durational battles, and the ultimate culmination of The Great War later to be called World War 1, entailed of two primary platforms or fronts. One was the established trench warfare as the method of battle had been for years prior that persisted for over two years followed by a war of despairing maneuvers in the end. The instigators or players were the German’s of the Central Powers against the Allied Powers of Great Britain, Russia, France, and in the end the U.S. As we have read, viewed, and studied within the various assignments of this course the evidence of a German planned war in my opinion didn’t exist. The precursors of war of course were carefully identified along the way, such as, agglomerations of prior-combat coalitions, imperialist oppositions, nationalism, and etc.

The military expansion leading up to World War I had caused tension between Germany and the other European countries. In the beginning of the 1900s, Germany’s military authority on policy making increased, allowing the army to be called a “State within a State”. This meant that the parliament and politicians didn’t have a say in the army’s strategy to protect the homeland. Later, the German Army would impose the Schlieften Plan, an operational plan for a designated attack on France once Russia had started to mobilize her forces near the German border. Due to

In consequence, The Schlieffen Plan offered German planners an offensive strategy that struck quickly in order to fight a war on two fronts. Wilhelm’s perceptions that the offense was the strongest course of action was misguided and built with bias that only led to a glorious German victory. Diplomatically, Wilhelm perceived that he would not be accused of instigating the global conflict. His sly maneuvers to use Serbia as a scapegoat in order to mobilize Russia and then mobilize in retaliation stands as a strong indicator that he personally wanted to be the aggressor, but seen as the reactionary actor. Lastly, Wilhelm perceived that his conquest would be achievable relatively quickly. He thought that he would be able to defeat France and then focus on Russia, before Russia was finished mobilizing their military. These three significant events before the war reinforce Wilhelm’s status conscious and aggressive personality, which largely drove policy towards the war in 1914.

This question has formed part of the historiography of the causes of the First World War, a historical debate that has endured ever since the conflict ended. It periodically resurfaces with new theories being advanced such as the Fischer thesis, usually on account of the release of previously unseen documents or because of a shift in the political climate. It has emerged to the fore once again because this year is the centennial of the war’s outbreak and there are plans to commemorate it nationally across the UK.

The Schlieffen plan was not successful for the Germans. They were unprepared, and had underestimated their enemies. The main reason as to why the Schlieffen plan failed was that the Germans were too stubborn to change or adjust it once it had been finalized. The plan was not flexible at all and Moltke would refuse to budge from the original plan. Schlieffen’s plan, although it took nine years to finalize, was not well thought out after they attacked France. If the Germans had been willing to change the plan a little, it may have

After the First World War (1914-1919), the world was faced with the questions - who was responsible and what was reason for the outbreak of the war. Ultimately it was agreed on the 28 June 1919 that “the Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage” from the First World War. However, there have been many other interpretations on whom and what was responsible for the war. On the one hand, some historians would agree with David Lloyd George’s notion of all “the nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war”, however, on the contrary, others would agree with Fischer in arguing that Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was responsible for the First World War. Whether you agree with Lloyd George or Fischer, it is important to understand some of the other possible reasons for the outbreak of the First World War – including the growth of nationalism and imperialism, the alliances within Europe and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although this essay will argue that Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was responsible for the outbreak of the First World War, it will also illustrate why other historians have argued against that notion.