3. Let V be a variable representing the value that consumers who want grass-fed beef put on the caracteristics. V is different for every consumer. Let q represent the quality = number of months a steer is fed grass. Let p be the price of beef. Let 1=grass fed beef and 0= not grass fed, so quality is q1 or q0. Price is p1 or p0. Assuming p1>p0 and q1>q0 and using the formula for product differentiations in chapter 9, derive the market share indifference value (e.g. derive the V for a consumer who is just indifferent between grass fed and not grass fed beef)?

3. Let V be a variable representing the value that consumers who want grass-fed beef put on the caracteristics. V is different for every consumer. Let q represent the quality = number of months a steer is fed grass. Let p be the price of beef. Let 1=grass fed beef and 0= not grass fed, so quality is q1 or q0. Price is p1 or p0. Assuming p1>p0 and q1>q0 and using the formula for product differentiations in chapter 9, derive the market share indifference value (e.g. derive the V for a consumer who is just indifferent between grass fed and not grass fed beef)?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter2: Mathematics For Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2.16P

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