5. Changes in incentives Suppose the large number of auto accidents in a small town results in new legislation that requires all citizens of the town to install new anti-lock brakes on their cars. These new brakes cut the time it takes a car to stop by 50%, allowing drivers to avoid collisions with other cars and pedestrians more easily. The new brakes the probability that a vehicle will collide with another vehicle but also give drivers an incentive to drive more which could potentially the number of car accidents in the town.

5. Changes in incentives Suppose the large number of auto accidents in a small town results in new legislation that requires all citizens of the town to install new anti-lock brakes on their cars. These new brakes cut the time it takes a car to stop by 50%, allowing drivers to avoid collisions with other cars and pedestrians more easily. The new brakes the probability that a vehicle will collide with another vehicle but also give drivers an incentive to drive more which could potentially the number of car accidents in the town.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.2IP

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Pisa Pizza, a seller of frozen pizza, is considering introducting a healthier version of its pizza that will be low in cholesterol and contain no trans fats. The firm expects that sales of new pizza will be $20 million per year. While many of these sales will be to new customers, Pisa Pizza estimaes that 40% will come from customers who switch to the new, healthier pizzai nstead of buying the original version. a) Assume cusotmer will spend the same amount on either version. What level of incremental sales is associated with introducing the new pizza? b) Suppose that 50% of hte cusomters who will switch from Pisa Pizza's orignial pizza to its healthier pizza will switch to another brand if Pisa PIzza does not introduce a healthier pizza. What level of incremental sales is associated with introducing the new pizza in this case?
Mete is Esra's boyfriend. Esra is expecting a marriage proposal from Mete. Today is Sunday. Mete says Esra that: (1) he is going to propose Esra on Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday or Friday, at 10:00 pm. (2) he knows right now the day when he will propose (3) but the day of proposal will be a surprise to Esra: On the day of the proposal, she would not be expecting the proposal that day. Esra says Mete that what he says is impossible. Explain why Esra is right in a few sentences.
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Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability? Question…
Consider Bob's decision problem: Sunny Cloudy Rainy Beach 2 3 2 Park 3 3 2 Mall -1 1 x Suppose the probability of Sunny is 0.25, the probability of Cloudy is 0.25, and the probability of Rainy is 0.5. What is the smallest value of x for which Mall is an expected utility maximiser? Round your answer to one decimal place (e.g. 0.5).
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Clancy has $4800. He plans to bet on a boxing match betweenSullivan and Flanagan. He finds that he can buy coupons for $6 thatwill pay off $10 each if Sullivan wins. He also finds in another storesome coupons that will pay off $10 if Flanagan wins. The Flanagantickets cost $4 each. Clancy believes that the two fighters each have aprobability of ½ of winning. Clancy is a risk averter who tries tomaximize the expected value of the natural log of his wealth. Whichof the following strategies would maximize his expected utility? (a) Don’t Gamble (b) Buy 400 S tickets and 600 F tickets(c) Buy exactly as many F tickets and S tickets (d) Buy 200 S and 300 F(e) Buy 200 S and 600 F
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