Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 0 0 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 0 420 0 Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is _______ per gallon, and the total output is __________ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is , and Susan's profit is ___________ . Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water to per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit becomes __________ and Susan's profit becomes __________ . Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes __________ , Susan's profit becomes ____________ , and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now _________ . True or False: Based on the fact that both Raphael and Susan increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was larger than the price effect at that quantity. True False Note that Raphael and Susan started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Raphael decided to cheat, Susan decided to cheat as well. In other words, Susan's output decisions are based on Raphael's actions. This behavior is an example of ________ .
Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 0 0 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 0 420 0 Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is _______ per gallon, and the total output is __________ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is , and Susan's profit is ___________ . Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water to per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit becomes __________ and Susan's profit becomes __________ . Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes __________ , Susan's profit becomes ____________ , and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now _________ . True or False: Based on the fact that both Raphael and Susan increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was larger than the price effect at that quantity. True False Note that Raphael and Susan started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Raphael decided to cheat, Susan decided to cheat as well. In other words, Susan's output decisions are based on Raphael's actions. This behavior is an example of ________ .
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter6: Simple Pricing
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 9MC
Related questions
Question
Consider a town in which only two residents, Raphael and Susan, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Raphael and Susan can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
Price
|
Quantity Demanded
|
Total Revenue
|
---|---|---|
(Dollars per gallon)
|
(Gallons of water)
|
(Dollars)
|
3.60 | 0 | 0 |
3.30 | 35 | $115.50 |
3.00 | 70 | $210.00 |
2.70 | 105 | $283.50 |
2.40 | 140 | $336.00 |
2.10 | 175 | $367.50 |
1.80 | 210 | $378.00 |
1.50 | 245 | $367.50 |
1.20 | 280 | $336.00 |
0.90 | 315 | $283.50 |
0.60 | 350 | $210.00 |
0.30 | 385 | $115.50 |
0 | 420 | 0 |
Suppose Raphael and Susan form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is _______
per gallon, and the total output is __________
gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Raphael and Susan agree to split production equally. Therefore, Raphael's profit is
, and Susan's profit is ___________
.
Suppose that Raphael and Susan have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Raphael says to himself, "Susan and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."
After Raphael implements his new plan, the price of water to
per gallon. Given Susan and Raphael's production levels, Raphael's profit becomes __________
and Susan's profit becomes __________
.
Because Raphael has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Susan decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount.
After Susan increases her production, Raphael's profit becomes __________
, Susan's profit becomes ____________
, and total profit (the sum of the profits of Raphael and Susan) is now _________
.
True or False: Based on the fact that both Raphael and Susan increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was larger than the price effect at that quantity.
True
False
Note that Raphael and Susan started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Raphael decided to cheat, Susan decided to cheat as well. In other words, Susan's output decisions are based on Raphael's actions.
This behavior is an example of ________ .
Expert Solution
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
This is a popular solution!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 3 steps with 1 images
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics
Economics
ISBN:
9781305156050
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Principles of Microeconomics
Economics
ISBN:
9781305156050
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…
Economics
ISBN:
9781305506381
Author:
James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:
Cengage Learning