
Drug dealers and arch rivals Carl and Jason are both armed and find themselves unexpectedly in a dangerous stand-off. In an attempt to protect themselves, each of them has to choose from one of two actions: attempt to shoot the rival (S) or dodge and take cover (D). Each of them must decide simultaneously and independently, with each man aiming to maximize his own chance of survival. They face death not only from the rival’s shooting but also from ran- dom firing by police who are in hot pursuit of them. Their survival rates in each scenario are given as follows:
· - If Carl and Jason both choose S, then their survival probabilities are 34% and 29% respectively.
· - If Carl and Jason both choose D, then their survival probabilities are 36% and 39% respectively.
· - If Carl chooses S while Jason chooses D, then their survival probabilities are 38% and 32% respectively.
· - If Carl chooses D while Jason chooses S, then their survival probabilities are 35% and 38% respectively.
Based on the above information, answer the following questions:
1. (a) Write down the normal form representation of the above described simultaneous move game between Carl and Jason. (Note: if you prefer, you can write this by hand on a white piece of paper and attach an image of your work).
2. (b) Find the corresponding pure-strategy Nash Equilibirum if it exists. Explain your answer.
3. (c) Does each player have a dominant strategy in this game? Based on your answer, com- pare and find the main differences between the game characterized in part (a) with the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
4. (d) Suppose now that instead of interacting simultaneously, the players move sequentially with either Carl or Jason moving first and their choice is observed by the player moving second. In particular, then answer all questions below assuming that Carl moves first. Represent the extensive form of this sequential move game using a game tree. Predict the outcome of this game. Does the player moving first have an advantage?

Step by stepSolved in 3 steps with 1 images

- Consider the following game played by four individuals, players 1, 2, 3, and 4. Each individual has $10,000. Each player can donate between $0 and $10,000 to build a public park that costs $20,000. If they collect enough money, they construct the park, which is worth $9,000 to each of them. However, if they collect less than $20,000, they cannot build a park. Furthermore, regardless of whether the park is built or not, individuals lose any donations that they make. a) Describe the Nash equilibria for a simultaneous game. What makes them equilibria? Hint: There are many equilibria, so you may want to use a mathematical expression! b) Suppose that players 1, 2, and 3, each donate $4,000 for the park. How much will player 4 donate and why. What are the resulting payoffs for the players? c) Suppose instead that player 1 donated first, player 2 second, player 3 third, and player 4 last. Furthermore, players could only donate in intervals of 1,000 (0, $1,000, $2,000, etc.). How much will…arrow_forwardConsider the following sequential-move game: This game involves three players, each making sequential decisions. The game proceeds as follows: • Player 1 initiates the game by choosing between two actions: Left and Right. • Depending on Player 1's choice, Player 2 then decides, choosing between two actions, left (I) and right (`r`). • Finally, Player 3 makes the last move in the sequence, choosing between actions `a` and `b`. The payoffs are determined by the sequence of choices made by all three players. Each payoff is represented by the triplet (x,y,z), where x, y, and z denote the payoffs for Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3, respectively. For example, if Player 1 chooses 'Left', Player 2 chooses 'I', and Player 3 chooses `a` the resulting payoff would be (3,1,2). This indicates that Player 1 receives a payoff of $3, Player 2 receives a payoff of $1, and Player 3 receives a payoff of $2 for this particular sequence of actions. Left Player 2 Player 1 Right Player 2 Player 3 Player 3…arrow_forwardThis is a connected question that requires the first answer to get the second. Thank you for your time.arrow_forward
- There are three players who must each choose an “effort” level from 1 to 7, that is, Si = {1, 2, 3, ..., 7}. The payoff for each player i is ui(si, s−i) = 10 max{s1, s2, s3} − si. How many pure- strategy Nash equilibria are there? Select one: a.2 b.4 c.none of the other answers d.3 e.1arrow_forwardTaylor, Faith, Jay, and Jessica are college roommates. They're trying to decide where the four of them should go for spring break: Orlando or Las Vegas. If they order the tickets by 11:00 PM on February 1, the cost will be just $500 per person. If they miss that deadline, the cost rises to $1,200 per person. The following table shows the benefit (in dollar terms) that each roommate would get from the two trips. Roommate Taylor Benefit from Orlando Benefit from Las Vegas Faith $1,250 $800 $550 $800 Jay Jessica $650 $600 $850 $1,050 The roommates tend to put off making decisions. So, when February 1 rolls around and they still haven't made a decision, they schedule a vote for 10:00 PM that night. In case of a tie, they will flip a coin between the two vacation destinations. The roommates will get the most total benefit if they choose to go to Given the individual benefits each roommate receives from the two trips, which trip will each roommate vote for? Fill in the table with each…arrow_forwardConsider the following game. You will roll a fair, 6-sided die either once or twice. You decide whether to do the second roll after you see how the first one lands. The payoff is $n, where n is the outcome of the last roll. For example, if the first roll lands 4 and the second lands 2, you win $2. If you only do one roll and it lands 4, you win $4. Suppose you make your decision about whether to go for a second roll based on expected monetary value. Then you will go for a second roll if (and only if) the first roll lands x or lower. What is x?arrow_forward
- If the players play pure strategies, the game has no Nash equilibrium. But what if they choose their moves randomly? Let each player instead opt for a mixed strategy instead of a pure strategy. The first will play action Z with probability p, and the second will play action L with probability q. At which pair (p, q) are the mixed strategies of the players in equilibrium? At which pair (p, q) does neither player want to change strategy? When are both strategies simultaneously the best response?arrow_forwardTwo neighborhood kids can play at home or walk to a nearby park. Playing with their toys yields some happiness. However, they would enjoy playing with the other kid at the park even more at the park. But each has a concern that if they go the park the other will not show up. This is an interesting game or situation because neither kid has an incentive to betray the other and not show up, but each kid fears walking to the park and having no one to play with. They also have to fear that if the other kid thinks they won't show up, that other kid will won't show up. All this strategic thinking is a lot for kids to take in. Here is the payoff matrix: Kid 1 Toys at Home Park Toys at Home Kid 2 Park How many Nash equilbria are there? 1,2,3 or 4 There is an option to let Kid 1 move first, but no option for Kid 2 to move first. Should Kid 2 let Kid 1 move first. Yes or No Blank # 1 Blank # 2arrow_forwardReturn to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits to her choice of effort level first. On observing this decision, Nancy commits to her own effort level. What is the subgame - perfect equilibrium of the game where the joint profits are 5m + 4n+ mn, the costs of their efforts to Monica and Nancy are m2 and n2, respectively, and Monica commits to an effort level first? Compare the payoffs to Monica and Nancy with those found in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Does this game have a first-mover or second - mover advantage? Using the same joint profit function as in part (a), find the subgame - perfect equilibrium for the game where Nancy must commit first to an effort level. U10. Return to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits…arrow_forward
- Table 9-03. Suppose you are a general in the army. Your country is at war. You are trying to invade the enemy. You can attack on the enemys east coast or the west coast. The enemy has only enough troops to defend one coast. The payoff matrix below represents whether you or the enemy wins (represented by 1) or loses (represented by 0). Enemy Defend east coast Defend west coast Enemy: 1 Enemy: 0 Attack east coast You: 0 You: 1 You Enemy: 0 Enemy: 1 Attack west coast You: 1 You: 0 Refer to Table 9-03. To win the war, O a. you must attack the west coast, only if you have credible information that the enemy is defending the east coast. O b. you must attack the west coast, and information about whether the enemy is defending the east or the west coast is irrelevant to you. c. you must attack the west coast, only if you have credible information that the enemy is defending the west coast. d. you must never attack the west coast, and information about whether the enemy is defending the east or…arrow_forwardNonearrow_forwardTwo discount stores (Megastore and Superstore) are interested in expanding their market share through advertising. The table below depicts the strategic outcomes (profits) of both stores with and without advertising. Superstore - Advertise Superstore - Don't Advertise Megastore - Advertise $95, $80 $305, $55 Megastore - Don't Advertise $65, $285 $165, $115 When the game does reach Nash Equilibrium, the payoffs for both stores will be a) Megastore $95 and Superstore $80 b) Megastore $305 and Superstore $55 c) Megastore $65 and Superstore $285 d) Megastore $165 and Superstore $115arrow_forward
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education





