Firm A's additional profit when cheating: $Compare the profits of Firm A when both firms respect the collusive agreement to the profits of Firm A when both firmscheat on the agreement. By how much would the profit of Firm A fall if both firms cheat on the agreement to collude?Round your answer to the nearest whole number.Firm A's lost profits when both cheat: $ The accompanying payoff matrix presents the profits for Firm A and Firm B under two pricing strategies.Firm A's strategyHigh priceLow priceFirm A Profit = $103Firm A Profit = $85High priceFirm B Profit = $85Firm B Profit = $39Firm B's strategyFirm A Profit = $77Firm A Profit = $39Low priceFirm B Profit = $103Firm B Profit = $77Suppose both firms have agreed to employ strategies that maximize their combined profits. How will the firms act?Firm A willFirm B willSet a high priceSet a high priceSet a low priceSet a low priceCompare the profits of Firm A when both firms respect the collusive agreement to the profits of Firm A when Firm Asecretly cheats on the agreement. How much additional profit would Firm A earn by secretly cheating on the agreement tocollude? Round your answer to the nearest whole number.

Combined profits:If Firm A and firm B chooses High price – then the combined profit is 85+85 = $170…

Answered: Firm A's additional profit when…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Similar questions

Suppose that firm A and firm B repeatedly face the situation presented in the table below, and the interest rate is 40 percent. The firms agree to charge a high price each period, provided neither firm has cheated on this agreement in the past. Fir m B Firm A Price Low High Low 0, 0 50; -40 High -40, 50 10; 10 What are firm’s A profits if it cheats on the collusive agreement? What are A’s profits if it does not cheat on the collusive agreement? Does equilibrium result where the firms charge the high price each period?
Consider two oligopolists, each choosing between a “high” and a “low” level of production. Given their choices of how much to produce, their profits will be as follows: Explain how firm B will reason that it makes sense to produce the high amount, regardless of what firm A chooses. Then explain how firm A will reason that it makes sense to produce the high amount, regardless of what firm B chooses. How might collusion assist the two firms in this case?
Assume the market for a product can be described as a Cournot duopoly with two identical firms. The Nash-equilibrium in this market is that the two firms produce the same quantity. Hence, they will have identical market shares, each will have 50%. Assume that firm 1 decides to invest in a technology that reduces its marginal costs. a) What will happen to the two firms market shares? You must explain how you find the answer. b) What will happen to total production and the price of the product? Again, explain your answer.
When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term—that the incentives for individual members to cheat would become too strong. More than forty years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons. Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons.
As the number of firms in an oligopoly industry decreases, the market moves closer to a __________ market. Over the last 60 or so years, the percentage of women with paid jobs has increased significantly. Is this increase in female employment associated with an increase in the demand for labor, or is it associated with an increase in the supply of labor? How does increased immigration affect the labor market? How would the equilibrium wage and the equilibrium quantity of labor be affected?
The two major scooter companies in India, ABC and XYZ, are competing for a fixed market. If both manufacturers make major model changes in a year, then their percentage market share not change. Also, if they both do not make major model changes, their percentage market share remains constant. If ABC makes a major model change and XYZ does not, then ABC is able to take away a% of the market away from XYZ, and if XYZ makes a major model change ABC does not, XYZ is able to take away b% of the market away from ABC. Express this as a 2 x 2 game and solve for the optimal strategy for each of the companies.
are two firms that are considering entering a new market, and must make their decision without knowing what the other firm has done. Unfortunately the market is only big enough to support one of the two firms. If both firms enter the market then they will each make a loss of £20 million. If only one firm enters the market, that firm will earn a profit of £80 million, and the other firm will just break even. If both firms do not enter the market, then they will just break evenas well Construct the normal form for this game . Construct the extensive form for this game . What outcomes, if any, are Nash equilibria? (explain the decision step by step) Based on a maximin strategy, what will be the outcome? (explain the decision step by step) Question There are two firms that are considering entering a new market, and must make their decision without knowing what the other firm has done. Unfortunately the market is only big enough to support one of the two…
In a market there are five firms, all have a total cost curve equal to CT = 2q. The market demand is Q = 500 - 5P. How much profit would each firm get if they collude and share the market equitably? What is the profit to each firm if they agree to collude, but one firm misleads the others charging a slightly lower price? What is the profit if all firms do not collude and compete via price?
Two firms, A and B, are each considering trying to develop a newwidget. Whichever firm is first to develop the new widget wins a patent worth $20 million plus a penny.Developing a new widget involves several ‘steps’. The firms alternate moves, with A moving first, until oneof them wins the patent. All moves are observed. In each turn, a firm can choose whether to take 0, 1, or2 development ‘steps’. Taking 0 steps in a turn costs that firm $0. Taking 1 step in a turn costs $4 million.And taking 2 steps in a turn costs $11 million. For simplicity, assume a zero discount rate. Initially, eachfirm is 4 steps away from completing development.(a) Describe and explain carefully what will happen in this patent race and why. [Hint: it may help toread Dutta ch 12 (but notice I changed the numbers).](b) Very briefly explain what is the economic rationale for granting ‘intellectual property rights’ such aspatents. What are some disadvantages for society of granting such rights?
Consider a market with four firms. Suppose the first firm has a 39% market share, the second firm has a 30% market share, the third firm has a 20% market share, and the fourth firm has a 11% market share. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), what is this market's level of concentration? Now suppose the third and fourth firms propose to merge. Were they to merge, then the market's HHI would increase to? Given the increase in the HHI that would be caused by the proposed merger, would the government likely allow such a merger to occur?
Consider a "Betrand price competition model" between two profit maximizing widget producers say A and B. The marginal cost of producing a widget is 4 for each producer. Each widget producer has a capacity constraint to produce only 5 widgets. There are 8 identical individuals who demand 1 widget only, and individuals value each widget at 6. If the firms are maximizing profits, then which of the following statement is true: a) Firm A and Firm B will charge 4 b) Firm A and Firm B will charge 6 c) Firm A and Firm B will charge greater than or equal to 5 d) None of the options are correct. Explain clearly.
what are the disadvantages of collusion in economics

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