Music Chairs 5 players are playing a new game of musical chairs with the following rules: There are 7 black chairs and 1 red chairs. When the music stops, everyone must immediately pick a chair. If a chair is picked by only one player, this player will sit on the chair and get 1 point if it's a black chair, and 5 points if it's a red chair. If two or more players picked the same chair, they all get 0 points (no one can sit). All players want to maximise points. Is there a Nash equilibrium with the following outcome? "1 players pick red chairs. The rest of the guys pick black chairs."

Music Chairs 5 players are playing a new game of musical chairs with the following rules: There are 7 black chairs and 1 red chairs. When the music stops, everyone must immediately pick a chair. If a chair is picked by only one player, this player will sit on the chair and get 1 point if it's a black chair, and 5 points if it's a red chair. If two or more players picked the same chair, they all get 0 points (no one can sit). All players want to maximise points. Is there a Nash equilibrium with the following outcome? "1 players pick red chairs. The rest of the guys pick black chairs."

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.8P

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18. Choose the correct answer from the given below.
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