QUESTION 7 Suppose two firms (X and Y) want to merge together. X currently controls 50.59% of the market, and Y currently controls 35.96% of the market. If X and Y merge, by how many points will the HHI increase? with X and Y separate) Hint this is the value of (HHI with X and Y merged) - (HHI Round your answers to two (2) decimal places if necessary

QUESTION 7 Suppose two firms (X and Y) want to merge together. X currently controls 50.59% of the market, and Y currently controls 35.96% of the market. If X and Y merge, by how many points will the HHI increase? with X and Y separate) Hint this is the value of (HHI with X and Y merged) - (HHI Round your answers to two (2) decimal places if necessary

ECON MICRO

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337000536

Author:William A. McEachern

Publisher:William A. McEachern

Chapter15: Economic Regulation And Antitrust Policy

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4.7P

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