The next two questions are about interacting with people during COVID. When we encounter another person these days, we would like to know how likely it is that they have COVID-19 before we get too close. While many people with COVID-19 don't know they have it, they do know how careful they tend to be (whether they avoid crowds, etc.). So this is a case of asymmetric information - they know how careful they are, and you don't. Further, assume that people who are less-careful are annoyed by people not wanting to meet them, and would like to be perceived as being more-careful. What would our model of asymmetric information tell us might happen if we have no idea how careful the person we're about to meet is being? An inefficiently high number of meetings would occur Everyone would start being extra-careful about COVID Increasingly, people would refuse to meet with anyone, whether they're actually careful or not We'd assume that everyone we meet is being careful about COVID

The next two questions are about interacting with people during COVID. When we encounter another person these days, we would like to know how likely it is that they have COVID-19 before we get too close. While many people with COVID-19 don't know they have it, they do know how careful they tend to be (whether they avoid crowds, etc.). So this is a case of asymmetric information - they know how careful they are, and you don't. Further, assume that people who are less-careful are annoyed by people not wanting to meet them, and would like to be perceived as being more-careful. What would our model of asymmetric information tell us might happen if we have no idea how careful the person we're about to meet is being? An inefficiently high number of meetings would occur Everyone would start being extra-careful about COVID Increasingly, people would refuse to meet with anyone, whether they're actually careful or not We'd assume that everyone we meet is being careful about COVID

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter2: Mathematics For Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2.15P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Suppose Grace and Lisa are to go to dinner. Lisa is visiting Grace from outof town, and they are to meet at a local restaurant. When Lisa lived in town,they had two favorite restaurants: Bel Loc Diner and the Corner Stable. Ofcourse, Lisa’s information is out of date, but Grace knows which is betterthese days. Assume that the probability that the Bel Loc Diner is better isp > 1/2 and the probability that the Corner Stable is better is 1 - p. Naturedetermines which restaurant Grace thinks is better. Grace then sends amessage to Lisa, either “Let’s go to the Bel Loc Diner,” “Let’s go to theCorner Stable,” or “I don’t know [which is better].” Lisa receives the message, and then Grace and Lisa simultaneously decide which restaurant to go to. Payoffs are such that Grace and Lisa want to go to the same restaurant, but they prefer it to be the one that Grace thinks is better. More specifically, if, in fact, the Bel Loc Diner is better, then the payoffs from theiractions are as shown in the…
Why is there asymmetric information in the labor market? What signals can an employer look for that might indicate file traits they are seeking in a new employee?
Say there are two individuals; Hala and Anna who are deciding on either to buy health insurance on a pooling arrangement basis or otherwise. Both face a 30% probability of losing RM40 on medical services and 70% of losing nothing. With these information discuss whether Hala and Anna should join this arrangement or pay the medical services costs out of their own pocket money.
Microeconomics Wilfred’s expected utility function is px1^0.5+(1−p)x2^0.5, where p is the probability that he consumes x1 and 1 - p is the probability that he consumes x2. Wilfred is offered a choice between getting a sure payment of $Z or a lottery in which he receives $2500 with probability p = 0.4 and $3700 with probability 1 - p. Wilfred will choose the sure payment if Z > CE and the lottery if Z < CE, where the value of CE is equal to ___ (please round your final answer to two decimal places if necessary)
Tom, who has a utility-of-wealth function U(w) = ln(w + 10), has $500 of income before tax and is taxed at a rate of 25% of earned income. If he is caught underreporting his income he will have to pay the taxes owed and in addition will pay a fine of $2 for every dollar of income he failed to report. How much income will he conceal (i.e., fail to report) if the probability of being caught is 0.1? Also find the market opportunity line and determine the minimum amount of fine such that there is no tax evasion at all.
The evidence is overwhelming that obesity generates demand for more joint replacements.O .A) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, user fees will solve the problem.O. B) This is an ex-ante moral hazard problem, incentives for obesity reduction, such as subsidies for exercise, may alleviate the problem.O. C) This is cherry-picking by orthopaedic surgeons.O. D) Since this is adverse selection, the total cost of a public insurance system will not be affected.OE) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, co-insurance will solve the problem.
18.5 Suppose there is a 50–50 chance that an individual with log- arithmic utility from wealth and with a current wealth of $20,000 will suffer a loss of $10,000 from a car accident. Insur- ance is competitively provided at actuarially fair rates. Compute the outcome if the individual buys full insurance. Compute the outcome if the individual buys only partial insurance covering half the loss. Show that the outcome in part (a) is preferred. Now suppose that individuals who buy the partial rather than the full insurance policy take more care when driv- ing, reducing the damage from loss from $10,000 to $7,000. What would be the actuarially fair price of the partial policy? Does the individual now prefer the full or the partial policy?
Susan was frustrated. As chair of the school of nursing at the local university, she wantedher students to get used to using electronic health records. Ideally, these students wouldleave her program and be able to use their employer’s EHR system without any additionalorientation. Other campus health profession leaders had similar concerns. However, thefaculty found that within a 100-mile radius of the university, the area’s many hospitals andthree main healthcare systems all used different EHR vendors.The local healthcare systems promoted electronic health information. They were allconcerned about the safety and security of the records and the needs of their patients. Theywere also aware of the national push for system to integrate EHRs. In reality, however, therecords housed in the variety of systems could not be shared. The software was toodisconnected and dissimilar.Susan wondered what her next step should be. Which system should she adopt, ifany? How could she help move these…
Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what is…
Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. Under a negligence standard, what are…
Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this…
Suppose in a given state's new insurance marketplace, with community rating and no restrictions on who can buy at the community rate, the risk pool (distribution of expected health costs) is as follows: 30% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $1,000 (per year)65% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $2,0005% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $10,000 Now suppose one insurer, and one insurer only, were allowed to offer any premium it wanted to any potential buyer and to exclude those it did not want to cover? What premium would they likely charge and who would they sell to and who would they exclude? What would happen to the other insurers? Does this help you see why the ACA was written to apply to all insurers?