Walmart Н L' (0, 2) (1, 1) (2,0) НЕВ Н Suppose that Walmart believes with probability i that HEB will play strat- egy H, with probability i that HEB will play L. • Calculate Walmart's expected payoff if Walmart plays any one of its pure strategies. • Calculate Walmart's expected payoff if it chooses to play H' with probability and play L' with probability . Now assume with probability 2 that HEB will play L. HEB will play strategy H, with probability • Calculate Walmart's expected payoff if Walmart plays any one of its pure strategies. • Calculate Walmart's expected payoff if it chooses to play H' with probability and play L' with probability . Is there any strict or weakly dominated strategy for HEB? Try to find all of them. Is there any strict or weakly dominated strategy for Walmart? Try to find all of them.
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- 2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?A risk-averse agent, Andy, has power utility of consumption with riskaversion coefficient γ = 0.5. While standing in line at the conveniencestore, Andy hears that the odds of winning the jackpot in a new statelottery game are 1 in 250. A lottery ticket costs $1. Assume his income isIt = $100. You can assume that there is only one jackpot prize awarded,and there is no chance it will be shared with another player. The lotterywill be drawn shortly after Andy buys the ticket, so you can ignore therole of discounting for time value. For simplicity, assume that ct+1 = 100even if Andy buys the ticket How large would the jackpot have to be in order for Andy to play thelottery? b) What is the fair (expected) value of the lottery with the jackpot youfound in (a)? What is the dollar amount of the risk premium that Andyrequires to play the lottery? Solve for the optimal number of lottery tickets that Andy would buyif the jackpot value were $10,000 (the ticket price, the odds of winning,and Andy’s…In the final round of a TV game show, contestantshave a chance to increase their current winnings of$1 million to $2 million. If they are wrong, theirprize is decreased to $500,000. A contestant thinkshis guess will be right 50% of the time. Should heplay? What is the lowest probability of a correctguess that would make playing profitable?
- please very very urgent Given the utility function, U(X)=ln(X) where X > 0, with initial consumption C=30000. Calculate the risk premium for a fair game with a chance of loosing -20000 is 0.5? (Hint: Start with the "fair game" definition)Eunice, the industry analyst of H&M, wants to determine the propensity of Major Clothingcompanies toward risk. She was able to determine the utility distribution of H&M, Uniqloand Dickies. For H&M, If the expected payoff of a venture is a loss of 125,000, the utilityvalue is 0.00, if a loss of 75,000, the utility value is .2, if breakeven, the utility value is .5,if gain of 75,000 .8 and if gain of 125,000 utility value is 1. For Uniqlo, if loss of 125,000utility value is 0, if loss of 75,000 utility value is .1, breakeven is .4, if a gain of 75,000,utility value is .7 and if gain of 125,000 utility value is 1. For Dickies, if loss of 125,000,utility value is 0, if loss of 75,000, utility value is .3 breakeven is .6, if gain of 75,000, utilityvalue is .9 and gain of 125,000, utility value is 1. What is the propensity to risk of the threeinternet companies? Explain your graph.(a) Calculate the safety levels of both players.(b) Find the set of all Nash equilibria (pure and mixed).
- Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.Clancy has $4800. He plans to bet on a boxing match betweenSullivan and Flanagan. He finds that he can buy coupons for $6 thatwill pay off $10 each if Sullivan wins. He also finds in another storesome coupons that will pay off $10 if Flanagan wins. The Flanagantickets cost $4 each. Clancy believes that the two fighters each have aprobability of ½ of winning. Clancy is a risk averter who tries tomaximize the expected value of the natural log of his wealth. Whichof the following strategies would maximize his expected utility? (a) Don’t Gamble (b) Buy 400 S tickets and 600 F tickets(c) Buy exactly as many F tickets and S tickets (d) Buy 200 S and 300 F(e) Buy 200 S and 600 Fi am not sure how to ask anther question after the expert answered one of mine but here is a question i asked the expert and the naswer he game me in picture 1 & 2. the questions insnt linked from other sites its from bartleby just coudlnt see option to ask anther. can you answer this part now: Now assume the financial advisor knows that another advisor will offer a competitive portfolio. Based on historical data, he knows this competitive portfolio’s total return follows a normal distribution with mean £36mil and standard deviation of £2mil and is priced at 5% of total return. Clients will naturally choose the advisor which offers the portfolio with the highest net How does the distribution of profit over the range of financial prices considered in part B) changes, when the competitor is considered?
- Suppose that the consumer is asked to contemplate a gamble with a probability of 60% of winning Birr 10,000 with a utility of 10 utils, and a 40% probability of winning Birr 15,000 with a utility of 12 utils. A. What will be the expected income and expected utility of the consumer? B. If the utility of this consumer from a risk free alternative which gives him an income equal to the expected income of the risky alternative given above is equal to 11 utils, is this consumer risk lover or risk averse? Why? Illustrate your answer with the help of a diagramA manager is deciding whether to build a small or a large facility. Much depends on the future demand that thefacility must serve, and demand may be small or large. The manager knows with certainty the payoffs that willresult under each alternative, shown in the following payoff table. The payoffs (in $000) are the present values offuture revenues minus costs for each alternative in each event.What is the best choice if future demand will be low?You are evaluating the possibility that your company bids $150,000 for a particular construction job. (a) If a bid of $150,000 corresponds to a relative bid of 1.20, what is the dollar profit that your company would make from winning the job with this bid? Show your work. (b) Calculate an estimate of the expected profit of the bid of $150,000 for this job. Assume that, historically, 55 percent of the bids of an average bidder for this type of job would exceed the bid ratio of 1.20. Assume also that you are bidding against three other construction companies. Show your work.