You are the manager of a firm that competes against four other firms by bidding for government contracts. While you believe your product is better than the competition, the government purchasing agent views the products as identical and purchases from the firm offering the best price. Total government demand is Q= 2000 -5Pand all five firms produce at a constant marginal cost of $130. For security reasons, the government has imposed restrictions that permit a maximum of five firms to compete in this market; thus entry by new firms is prohibited. A member of Congress is concerned because no restrictions have been placed on the price that the government pays for this product. In response, she has proposed legislation that would award each existing firm 20 percent of a contract for 1200 units at a contracted price of $160 per unit. If this legislation is passed, by how much should you expect your profits to change? Instruction: If you expect profits to fall, enter a negative (-) number.

You are the manager of a firm that competes against four other firms by bidding for government contracts. While you believe your product is better than the competition, the government purchasing agent views the products as identical and purchases from the firm offering the best price. Total government demand is Q= 2000 -5Pand all five firms produce at a constant marginal cost of $130. For security reasons, the government has imposed restrictions that permit a maximum of five firms to compete in this market; thus entry by new firms is prohibited. A member of Congress is concerned because no restrictions have been placed on the price that the government pays for this product. In response, she has proposed legislation that would award each existing firm 20 percent of a contract for 1200 units at a contracted price of $160 per unit. If this legislation is passed, by how much should you expect your profits to change? Instruction: If you expect profits to fall, enter a negative (-) number.

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter9: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QFR

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