Concept explainers
Top-Two Instant-Runoff Voting. Exercises 39 and 40 refer to a simple variation of the plurality-with-elimination method called top-two IRV. This method works for winner-only elections. In top-two IRV, instead of eliminating candidates one at a time, we eliminate all the candidates except the top two in the first round and transfer their votes to the two remaining candidates.
Find the winner of the election given in Table 1-40 using the top-two IRV method.
Table 1-40
Number of Voters | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
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