Ken walks into an ice-cream parlor.Waiter: “We have vanilla and chocolate today.”Ken: “I’ll take vanilla.”Waiter: “I almost forgot. We also have strawberry.”Ken: “In that case, I’ll take chocolate.”What standard property of decision making is Kenviolating? (Hint: Reread the section on Arrow’simpossibility theorem.)

Ken walks into an ice-cream parlor.Waiter: “We have vanilla and chocolate today.”Ken: “I’ll take vanilla.”Waiter: “I almost forgot. We also have strawberry.”Ken: “In that case, I’ll take chocolate.”What standard property of decision making is Kenviolating? (Hint: Reread the section on Arrow’simpossibility theorem.)

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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