(A)
The reaction function of the follower is to be ascertained.
(A)
Explanation of Solution
Reaction function of follower
Therefore, reaction function of the follower is
(B)
The equilibrium level of output for both the leader and follower is to be calculated.
(B)
Explanation of Solution
For finding the equilibrium output,putting the follower reaction function value of QF in P
Now,
Putting
Now, put the value of QL in reaction function of follower.
Therefore , QL = 1750 units and QF = 375 units.
(C)
The
(C)
Explanation of Solution
Equilibrium market price
Therefore, equilibrium market price is $7500.
(D)
The profits of both leader and follower is to be calculated.
(D)
Explanation of Solution
Profit of the leader is
Profit of the follower is
Therefore , profit of the leader is $6125000 and profit of the follower is $562500.
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Chapter 9 Solutions
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
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