Amphibious warfare

According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, “it is often highlighted the US Marine Corps has not conducted an amphibious assault since the Korean War, although technically this is not true. The Marine Corps has conducted 4 amphibious assaults in just the last 2 decades.” (Emphasis added) Lt. General George Flynn argues that “in the past twenty years U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises least one hundred and four times. These operations represent a crisis response rate more than

Some people deem amphibious warfare to be a way of the past never to be seen again in modern warfare. Large scale amphibious warfare has not been utilized by the US in decades. Most of the ingress and egress that has occurred in recent conflict was conducted by aviation platforms. As an expeditionary naval force one of the core capabilities of the United States Marine Corps is amphibious warfare. Because of the Marine Corps stake in amphibious warfare, the relevancy of the organization has been questioned

order to have a successful amphibious landing and Holland Smith’s plan only had 2-1 superiority over the enemy. After proposing such a plan, Holland Smith was put in charge of the frontal charge that would be carried out in Tarawa. With this command, he proceeded to request the need for 100 more amtracs on top of 75 troop carrying amtracs that the 2nd Division Marines already had. This request did not go over well with the commander of the South Pacific Amphibious Force, Admiral Kelly Turner

“Before we’re through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell,” explained Admiral William F. Halsey in response to seeing the damage inflicted upon Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The United States entered World War II in December 1941 bearing a hostile attitude towards the Japanese and immediately focused forces in stopping Japan’s aggressive Pacific expansion. In pursuing power of the Pacific, the United States secured crucial victories at the Battle of Midway and Guadalcanal

Is the study of amphibious warfare best seen as a subset of naval history? Or should it be an area of study unto itself that actually intersects the history of warfare at sea, on land, and most recently in the air? Why or why not? The discussion of amphibious warfare and its primacy in military history is rather ambiguous in the sense that the study of amphibious warfare is incongruous with the traditional scholarship of naval and land warfare. While the use of amphibious tactics dates back through

Amphibious Warfare in the Early Continental Navy The prospect of amphibious invasion has historical been one of the most logistically difficult to coordinate military operations. This can be clearly seen in the case of the Penobscot Expedition of 1779, which is recognized as the worst defeat of the U.S. preceding the Attack on Pearl Harbor. However, not thirty years later, combined American land and naval elements launched a success overland assault and coordinated naval bombardment on the fortress

conduct forcible entry. The Army and Marine Corps saw significant successes utilizing forcible entry and amphibious operations in the Pacific during WWII and the Korean War. The landing at Inchon was “arguably the Corps’ greatest amphibious success” (Cancian, “Preserving Amphibious Capabilities in a Time of Austerity, 2012). Led by General MacArthur, Inchon remains the legacy by which future amphibious operations are compared against. However, it is important to recognize that in the past 60+ years

The United States Marine Corps is facing already 7th decade, since one of the major amphibious operation in history of 20th century. Yes, there are many developments for concepts, capabilities, training, organization and command structure, but purpose and nature of the amphibious operations still unchanged through the time. Based on the case studies of operation “CHROMITE” and comparing with current concepts and capabilities of the Marine Corps, we are prepared better to conduct forcible entry operations

Gill. This chapter relates directly to the assertion made by Duffy in the fact that Britain was limited to amphibious attack. To elaborate, when Gill states, “Great Britain would launch an amphibious attack on Holland in late July…" this would be one of the first times he referenced such an attack. Reason being is that the logic used in the book would fall in line with what Duffy stated in that such

In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, wanted to conduct a cross channel invasion bringing the fight directly to the Germans. Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, wanted to fight in the edges of the Axis territory and exploit the soft underbelly of Southern Europe. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, where the Allies’