Clandestine HUMINT

It involves humans as the primary source of data. Usually, HUMINT entails military attaches, diplomatic member, informants in refugee camps, and official delegations (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d). Clandestine HUMINT suppliers include agents employed or volunteering to provide data to foreign nationals. Montes (2015) discusses that Sinaloa Cartel has a sophisticated HUMINT that involves taxi drivers, border residents, and even security officers as well

As the fight against international terrorism gears up for renewed hostilities in areas of the Middle East against old foes and new organizations that have brought their extremists views to the battlefields, the socio-economic issues currently plaguing the stability of Yemen provide the backdrop for the most potent threat to the U.S. homeland and its interests in the region. This Red Cell Analysis will provide a historical overview and internal look at the terrorist organization known as Al-Qa’ida

would have been important in identifying or confirming one of these terrorist threats against the U.S. and allies The other three forms of intelligences we use to help with deal with terrorism is Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Counterintelligence. HUMINT is defined as any information that can be gathered from human sources. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is data collected from publicly available sources to be used in an intelligence context. Counterintelligence

SECTION I: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), meaning “army of pure”, is a Pakistani based Islamic terrorist organization. LET is a Sunni group, and they follow the Ahle-Haith interpretation of Islam, which is similar to Salafism.1 LET is consider as one of the oldest and extremely powerful jihad group. LET’s wants to conduct jihad on behalf of Allah, preach the true religion and train the new generation about true Islamic lines. LET aligns its ideology goals with the interest of the Pakistani state. LET has

Despite the negative attributes and criticisms of human intelligence, HUMINT is a valuable and essential member of the intelligence community as it accomplishes tasks that signals or imagery intelligence cannot. As Margolis writes, “the lack of HUMINT in intelligence operations leaves analysts staring at pictures, frantically searching through communications, reading newspapers, and measuring emissions to ascertain what is going on.” HUMIT is vital to the intelligence community as it allows access

Some experts and analysts were under the notion that al Shabaab was trending down. Except that merely one week ago, two events transpired that should put those misaligned prognostications to rest. First, al Shabaab recaptured the key port city of Merca, and second, they are also suspected of being responsible for an explosion aboard a Daallo Airlines flight from Mogadishu to Djibouti. The explosion tore a hole in the fuselage and sucked one man’s charred body out of the plane. These two events occurring

SECTION I: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), meaning “army of pure”, is a Pakistani based Islamic terrorist organization. LET is a Sunni group, and they follow the Ahle-Haith interpretation of Islam, which is similar to Salafism.1 LET is consider as one of the oldest and extremely powerful jihad group. LET’s wants to conduct jihad on behalf of Allah, preach the true religion and train the new generation about true Islamic lines. LET aligns its ideology goals with the interest of the Pakistani state. LET has

collectors. Further, Bundy asserts there is a very great difference between the guidance problems of the overt and semi-overt systems and those of clandestine collection is the one plus

As the acronym indicates intelligence is gathered from human sources. HUMINT is collected through overt collection by people overseas, clandestine acquisition of documents, photography and official contact with foreign government. Its collection length is varying case by case. Sometimes it takes only a few months but it could take years. During the cold war

coupled with the enemies they faced not from the common that they had shared with the Kurds, but the ones stateside who chose to use intelligence they received from unreliable sources opposed to their own team mates. The division between Analyst and Clandestine officer has been widely talked about as well as the inability to trust from both sides. This can be seen in the case of Operation Hotel California. If they analysts did not know what was going on before the NILE team reported it, then the intelligence