Joint Requirements Oversight Council

The joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) is being destined to initiate a new era of the U.S. military tactical vehicle that is designed to meet universal requirements for the future warfare and in hostile environments. Thus, at the same time, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) has been offering fruitful case study for the assessment on its program management and procurement processes. Therefore, this paper will briefly provide fundamental assessment on the JLTV program from the requirement development

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle debate’s primary focus was on the unspoken concern of the actual cost of the mammoth vehicles. What followed was a blend of discussions ranging from financial costs to lives cost on the battlefield. A different debate centered on the size of the vehicles, which separated the soldiers from the population, and counter to the idea of counterinsurgency. While the MRAP procurement was different from the typical acquisition program, the success of

Through the JCIDS and in conjunction with the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), the joint capabilities are developed. Within the DAS there are five phases of development to be considered.9 These are materiel solution analysis, technology development, engineering and manufacturing development, production and deployment, and operations and

or procure equipment necessary to successfully fight present wars (Carter, p.2). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees JCIDS and is “often misaligned because it often defers to the services. Neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the JROC” (p. 10, Lamb). As a result, the requirement for MRAPs was slow to validate and once valid remained an unfunded requirement until political pressure and public opinion forced the Pentagon to reevaluate fielding

That is, capability requirements are informed by joint doctrine and high level strategy. By late 2005, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Petraeus among other senior military leaders felt that a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was needed. Three efforts happened concurrently from early-to-mid 2005 to March of 2008. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center rewrote COIN Doctrine and GEN Petraeus started implementing it in Iraq, the Joint IED Task Force later known as (JIEDDO) developed

Commander of U.S. Central Command, declared that IEDs were the “No. 1 threat.” This declaration from one Combatant Commander (CCDR) was far short of the fundamentals required to develop a joint concept and its subsequent solutions. Although MRAPs seemingly provided a solution to an enemy capability, there was no joint concept that was idea-focused, collaboratively developed and assessed, or rigorously evaluated.

the State of California Department of Public Health. Certified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and accredited by joint commissions from both. Scripps Mercy Hospital is additionally accredited by American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP). Alvaredo Parkway is additionally accredited by the California Psychological Internship Council (CAPIC). The Naval Medical Center is additionally accredited by the

Short Answer: 1) List three executive branch organizations that conduct intelligence oversight. The National Security Council’s Office of Intelligence Programs, President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Department of Defense’s Intelligence Oversight Program all are executive branch organizations that conduct intelligence oversight. 2) The 17 members of the intelligence community are: • The Office of the Director of National Intelligence • Central Intelligence Agency • Department of

process which delayed fielding of MRAPs and should not be repeated for critical needs. Three primary processes drive the current Department of Defense (DoD) Major Defense Acquisition Programs. They are requirements, acquisition, and funding. The requirements approval process within the existing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was the greatest factor in the MRAP delay. The MRAP is a v-shaped hull vehicle designed early 1960s with additional armor to protect against surface

They are requirements, acquisition, and funding. The requirements approval process within the existing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was the greatest factor in the MRAP delay. The MRAP is a V-shaped hull vehicle designed early 1960s with additional armor to protect against surface mines and explosives. The elevated chassis and V-shaped hull caused the blast to disperse away from the vehicle protecting the crew.