Perdurantism

Does positing temporal parts provide a solution to the statue-clay paradox? The paradox in question makes it seem as if two objects can inhabit the same location at the same time, yet this is not the case eternally. At least one or both exist subsequently or beforehand the time of coincidence. In specific, the example being looked at is the statue-clay paradox whereby a lump of clay is moulded and therefore a statue is created. It is then displayed for all to see, however the question becomes what

This paper evaluates an argument against Perdurantism and presents possible alternatives to demonstrate that substances do not always overlap. Firstly, we utilize the Lump and Clay example from Effingham’s (20xx) An Introduction To Ontology to illustrate what Perdurantism entails. Afterwards, we object the anti-perdurantist’s argument because it is arbitrary to claim that a substance’s career only begins when it is born and it ceases when it dies. Then, we provide a response on behalf of the anti-perdurantist

Perdurantism generates one solution to the Problem of Change by demonstrating how an object can remain identical to itself regardless of the validity of the Problem of Change argument. The first two premises of the Problem of Change ignore Perdurantism, defining the man at t1 and t2 as two different presentations of the whole man. With this logic it is easy to recognize the change and use Leibniz’s Law to imply that there is a problem; however, Perdurantism solves problem and

Simplicity and Explanation: Physical Objects without Temporal Parts Philosophers debate over how to resolve the Problem of Change. The Problem of Change identifies a challenge for philosophers accounting for object persistence. To account for how an object persists, the Problem of Change bring up disagreements over the existence of temporal parts. In this paper, I present and explain a view wherein an object persists through change without positing the existence of temporal parts. As an adequate