1. A uniform price auction is an auction where all the winners pay the same price. A k-th price auction is an auction where the price paid by the winner(s) is the k-th highest bid. We run a 3rd price, uniform price auction for two items, so the winners are the two bidders with the highest bid. There are 4 bidders, A, B, C and D, and they bid respectively $10, $9, $8 and $12. (A) Bidders A and B win the auction and pay $9. (B) Bidders A and D win the auction and pay $9. (C) Bidders B and D win the auction and pay $10. (D) Bidders B and C win the auction and pay $8.

1. A uniform price auction is an auction where all the winners pay the same price. A k-th price auction is an auction where the price paid by the winner(s) is the k-th highest bid. We run a 3rd price, uniform price auction for two items, so the winners are the two bidders with the highest bid. There are 4 bidders, A, B, C and D, and they bid respectively $10, $9, $8 and $12. (A) Bidders A and B win the auction and pay $9. (B) Bidders A and D win the auction and pay $9. (C) Bidders B and D win the auction and pay $10. (D) Bidders B and C win the auction and pay $8.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5E

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