4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economic aid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1 being the lowest payoff) is shown below.

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4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle North
Korea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economic
aid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1
being the lowest payoff) is shown below.
CHINA
Aid
Don't aid
Dismantle
3,4
1,3
NORTH KOREA
[Kim Jong-un)
Don't
dismantle
4,2
2,1
(a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game (or explain why no such
equilibrium exists) in the case when North Korea and China move simultaneously.
(b) Is it possible for China to achieve its best possible outcome by credibly declaring a
strategic move in the pregame?
(i) If not, explain clearly why not?
(ii) If so, what sort of strategic move would China use? Draw a sequential game tree
where China takes its strategic decision choice in the pregame stage (that is in the first
node) and North Korea takes its decision next and explain with the help of this figure.
How might China phrase its declaration to North Korea?
Transcribed Image Text:4. North Koreas's leader Kim Jong-un must decide whether to keep or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, while China must decide whether or not to provide economic aid to North Korea. The ordinal payoff matrix (with 4 being the highest payoff and 1 being the lowest payoff) is shown below. CHINA Aid Don't aid Dismantle 3,4 1,3 NORTH KOREA [Kim Jong-un) Don't dismantle 4,2 2,1 (a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game (or explain why no such equilibrium exists) in the case when North Korea and China move simultaneously. (b) Is it possible for China to achieve its best possible outcome by credibly declaring a strategic move in the pregame? (i) If not, explain clearly why not? (ii) If so, what sort of strategic move would China use? Draw a sequential game tree where China takes its strategic decision choice in the pregame stage (that is in the first node) and North Korea takes its decision next and explain with the help of this figure. How might China phrase its declaration to North Korea?
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