9. . There are two players. . The payoffs to player 2 depend on whether 2 is a friendly player (with probability p) or a foe (with probability 1 - p). • Player 2 knows if he/she is a friend or a foe, but player 1 doesn't know. See the following payoff matrices for details. Friend Left Right Left 3,1 0,0 Right 2,1 1,0 with probability p Foe Right Left 0,1 Right 1,1 with muhabili. 1 with probability 1-p When p = 1/4, which is a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: (1's strategy; 2's type - 2's strategy) O (Right; Friend - Right, Foe - Right); O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Left); O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Right); (Right; Friend - Left, Foe - Right); Left 3,0 2,0
9. . There are two players. . The payoffs to player 2 depend on whether 2 is a friendly player (with probability p) or a foe (with probability 1 - p). • Player 2 knows if he/she is a friend or a foe, but player 1 doesn't know. See the following payoff matrices for details. Friend Left Right Left 3,1 0,0 Right 2,1 1,0 with probability p Foe Right Left 0,1 Right 1,1 with muhabili. 1 with probability 1-p When p = 1/4, which is a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: (1's strategy; 2's type - 2's strategy) O (Right; Friend - Right, Foe - Right); O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Left); O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Right); (Right; Friend - Left, Foe - Right); Left 3,0 2,0
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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2
![9.
There are two players.
The payoffs to player 2 depend on whether 2 is a friendly player (with probability p) or a foe (with probability 1 - p).
• Player 2 knows if he/she is a friend or a foe, but player 1 doesn't know.
See the following payoff matrices for details.
Friend
Left
Right
Left
3,1
0,0
Right
2,1
1,0
with probability p
Foe
Right
Left
0,1
Right
1,1
with muhabilit. 1
with probability 1-p
When p = 1/4, which is a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium:
(1's strategy; 2's type - 2's strategy)
O (Right; Friend - Right, Foe - Right);
O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Left);
O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Right);
(Right; Friend - Left, Foe - Right);
.
Left
3,0
2,0](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F95ff3d8d-fe29-424a-b43b-f792814f53c4%2F539717e7-9135-4257-be0c-59b4b2316183%2F5qi454n_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:9.
There are two players.
The payoffs to player 2 depend on whether 2 is a friendly player (with probability p) or a foe (with probability 1 - p).
• Player 2 knows if he/she is a friend or a foe, but player 1 doesn't know.
See the following payoff matrices for details.
Friend
Left
Right
Left
3,1
0,0
Right
2,1
1,0
with probability p
Foe
Right
Left
0,1
Right
1,1
with muhabilit. 1
with probability 1-p
When p = 1/4, which is a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium:
(1's strategy; 2's type - 2's strategy)
O (Right; Friend - Right, Foe - Right);
O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Left);
O (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Right);
(Right; Friend - Left, Foe - Right);
.
Left
3,0
2,0
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