Additional Problem #1: Battle of Sexes game: imagine a couple has a date night planned. However, each of their cell phones died and the couple had not decided between the opera or a boxing match. They share a common first objective, to meet at the same event. Their second objectives differ, though. The man prefers the boxing match and the woman prefers the opera. The following payoff matrix summarizes a version of this game. | Woman \ Man Вoxing. Орега Boxing (49, 59) |(30, 25) Opera (19, 11) |(62, 39) a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any exist. Show/Explain your work. Additional Problem #2: Game of Chicken: imagine two drivers are racing toward each other in cars. If a driver “swerves", he/she is known as a chicken. If a driver drives "straight" without swerving, he/she is a tough. However, if both drive "straight", then they crash, leading to a disastrous outcome. If both "swerve", then each driver is considered a coward. The following payoff matrix summarizes a version of this game. Driver 1 \ Driver 2 Straight Swerve Straight (-49, -59) | (19, -11) (-10, 25) Swerve (-2, -3) a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any exist. Show/Explain your work.

Additional Problem #1: Battle of Sexes game: imagine a couple has a date night planned. However, each of their cell phones died and the couple had not decided between the opera or a boxing match. They share a common first objective, to meet at the same event. Their second objectives differ, though. The man prefers the boxing match and the woman prefers the opera. The following payoff matrix summarizes a version of this game. | Woman \ Man Вoxing. Орега Boxing (49, 59) |(30, 25) Opera (19, 11) |(62, 39) a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any exist. Show/Explain your work. Additional Problem #2: Game of Chicken: imagine two drivers are racing toward each other in cars. If a driver “swerves", he/she is known as a chicken. If a driver drives "straight" without swerving, he/she is a tough. However, if both drive "straight", then they crash, leading to a disastrous outcome. If both "swerve", then each driver is considered a coward. The following payoff matrix summarizes a version of this game. Driver 1 \ Driver 2 Straight Swerve Straight (-49, -59) | (19, -11) (-10, 25) Swerve (-2, -3) a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any exist. Show/Explain your work.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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Keith and Blake play a simultaneous one-shot game given by the following table: Blake Left Right Тop 5.00. -5.00 0.00, -6.00 Kelth Bottom 6.00,0.co -2.00, 8.00 As there is no unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, assume that each player plays each of his chcices half of the time. What is the average payoff for Keith? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) What is the aver age payoff for Blake? |(Round to two decimals if necessary)
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1. Consider the game where initially She chooses between "Stay Home" and "Go Out". If She chooses "Stay Home" then She gets 2 and He gets 0. If She chooses "Go Out" then they each simultaneously choose "Movie" or "Concert" where the payoffs are 0,1 or 3 as in the Battle of the Sexes Game. What are the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria of this game ?
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