2. Assume a Hawk -Dove game with the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is Animal A's payoff, and the second entry is Animal B's payoff: Animal A (rows)/Animal B (columns) Hawk Dove (-5,-5) |(0,10) (10,0) (4,4) Hawk Dove An animal that plays Hawk will always fight until it wins or is badly hurt. An animal that plays Dove makes a bold display but retreats if his opponent starts to fight. If two Dove animals meet they share. (a) Explain why there cannot be an equilibrium where all animals act as Doves. (b) Explore whether there are any Nash equilibria in pure strategies and explain which these are and why. (c) Derive a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). What is the proportion of Hawks and Doves? If the proportion of Hawks in the population of animals is greater than the mixed strategy equilibrium proportion you calculated, which strategy does better, Hawks of Doves? Explain your answer.
2. Assume a Hawk -Dove game with the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is Animal A's payoff, and the second entry is Animal B's payoff: Animal A (rows)/Animal B (columns) Hawk Dove (-5,-5) |(0,10) (10,0) (4,4) Hawk Dove An animal that plays Hawk will always fight until it wins or is badly hurt. An animal that plays Dove makes a bold display but retreats if his opponent starts to fight. If two Dove animals meet they share. (a) Explain why there cannot be an equilibrium where all animals act as Doves. (b) Explore whether there are any Nash equilibria in pure strategies and explain which these are and why. (c) Derive a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). What is the proportion of Hawks and Doves? If the proportion of Hawks in the population of animals is greater than the mixed strategy equilibrium proportion you calculated, which strategy does better, Hawks of Doves? Explain your answer.
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.9P
Related questions
Question
![2.
Assume a Hawk -Dove game with the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is
Animal A's payoff, and the second entry is Animal B's payoff:
Animal A
Hawk
Dove
(rows)/Animal
B (columns)
(-5,-5)
(0,10)
(10,0)
(4,4)
Hawk
Dove
An animal that plays Hawk will always fight until it wins or is badly hurt. An animal that plays
Dove makes a bold display but retreats if his opponent starts to fight. If two Dove animals
meet they share.
(a) Explain why there cannot be an equilibrium where all animals act as Doves.
(b) Explore whether there are any Nash equilibria in pure strategies and explain which
these are and why.
(c) Derive a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). What is the proportion of Hawks
and Doves? If the proportion of Hawks in the population of animals is greater than
the mixed strategy equilibrium proportion you calculated, which strategy does better,
Hawks of Doves? Explain your answer.
(d) Draw the best response functions and show in the diagram all pure and mixed
strategy equilibria.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Faea966a4-ca14-4a41-a281-d7bb8701bee9%2F631c8181-7f1f-4614-9fb2-fe9be5fd1b06%2Fil23pfd_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:2.
Assume a Hawk -Dove game with the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is
Animal A's payoff, and the second entry is Animal B's payoff:
Animal A
Hawk
Dove
(rows)/Animal
B (columns)
(-5,-5)
(0,10)
(10,0)
(4,4)
Hawk
Dove
An animal that plays Hawk will always fight until it wins or is badly hurt. An animal that plays
Dove makes a bold display but retreats if his opponent starts to fight. If two Dove animals
meet they share.
(a) Explain why there cannot be an equilibrium where all animals act as Doves.
(b) Explore whether there are any Nash equilibria in pure strategies and explain which
these are and why.
(c) Derive a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). What is the proportion of Hawks
and Doves? If the proportion of Hawks in the population of animals is greater than
the mixed strategy equilibrium proportion you calculated, which strategy does better,
Hawks of Doves? Explain your answer.
(d) Draw the best response functions and show in the diagram all pure and mixed
strategy equilibria.
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