Consider a repeated game with two players and two rounds. The stage game is shown below. Assume the players have a common discount factor õE (0, 1). Which of the following is NOT TRUE? L M L 3, 3 2, 1 12,0 M 1, 2 6, 6 0, 0 H 0, 12 0, 0 10, 10 O There is a SPNE where the two firms play (L, L) in the first period and (M,M) in the second period. O There are 2 pure strategy NE and 1 mixed strategy NE for the stage game. O If the stage game is repeated for 3 times instead of 2, then the minimum $ldelta$ such that there is a SPNE where (H,H) is played in the first round is smaller. O If payoff for (L,L) is (0,0), then there is no way to sustain (H,H) in the first period. O There doesn't exist any discount factor such that (H,H) will be played in the first period since the game is finite.

Consider a repeated game with two players and two rounds. The stage game is shown below. Assume the players have a common discount factor õE (0, 1). Which of the following is NOT TRUE? L M L 3, 3 2, 1 12,0 M 1, 2 6, 6 0, 0 H 0, 12 0, 0 10, 10 O There is a SPNE where the two firms play (L, L) in the first period and (M,M) in the second period. O There are 2 pure strategy NE and 1 mixed strategy NE for the stage game. O If the stage game is repeated for 3 times instead of 2, then the minimum $ldelta$ such that there is a SPNE where (H,H) is played in the first round is smaller. O If payoff for (L,L) is (0,0), then there is no way to sustain (H,H) in the first period. O There doesn't exist any discount factor such that (H,H) will be played in the first period since the game is finite.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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