how how to construct the reference dependent utility function for two friends Kate and Mary whose gains and losses are listed as follows : Kate's net worth is $ 4.5 million ( decreased from $ 5.5 to $ 4.5 million ) Mary's net worth $ 3.2 million ( increased from $ 3 to $ 3.2 million ) ( First determine the reference point ( use a parameter ) and then derive reference utility function for

how how to construct the reference dependent utility function for two friends Kate and Mary whose gains and losses are listed as follows : Kate's net worth is $ 4.5 million ( decreased from $ 5.5 to $ 4.5 million ) Mary's net worth $ 3.2 million ( increased from $ 3 to $ 3.2 million ) ( First determine the reference point ( use a parameter ) and then derive reference utility function for

Economics (MindTap Course List)

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617383

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter20: Consumer Choice: Maximizing Utility And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8QP

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Economics Consider two friends Anna and Elsa whose gains and losses are listed as follows: Anna's investment is worth $2.5 million (decreased from $3.5 to $2.5 million) Elsa's investment is worth $2.2 million (increased from $2 to $2.2 million) For each of them write down the reference utility function (First determine the reference point (use a parameter) and derive reference utility function for each).
Consider two friends Anna and Elsa whose gains and losses are listed as follows: Anna's investment is worth $2.5 million (decreased from $3.5 to $2.5 million) Elsa's investment is worth $2.2 million (increased from $2 to $2.2 million) For cach of them write down the reference utility function (First determine the reference point (use a parameter) and derive reference utility function for each).
Consider two friends Anna and Elsa whose gains and losses are listed as follows: Anna's investment is worth $2.5 million (decreased from $3.5 to $2.5 million) Elsa's investment is worth $2.2 million (increased from $2 to $2.2 million) For each of them write down the reference utility function (First determine the reference point (use a parameter) and derive reference utility function for each).
Consider two individuals, Dani and Tom. Dani's utility function is given by U(c)=In(c), where c is the amount of consumption in a given period. Tom's utility is U(c)=c^2 a) In two separate graphs, draw Dani and Tom's utility function (U in y-axis, c in x-axis). b) Both Dani and Tom can purchase a lottery that pays 5 with 75% probability, and 15 with 25% probability. Calculate and mark on the graphs the utility evaluated at the expected level of consumption for the lottery. Then calculate and mark on the graphs the expected utility for Dani and Tom. c) How do utilities at the expected level of consumption compare to the expected utility? What explains the difference between Dani and Tom? What implication does this difference have for their risk preferences?
2. Alice believes that her car would cost £12500 to replace if it was stolen or damaged. Based on crime statistics for the area she lives in, she believes that the probability of her car being stolen or damaged is 0.15. (i) Alice's utility function is given by U(w) = ln(w) for w > 0 and she as £35000 in the bank. Calculate how much Alice would be prepared to pay (in a single payment) to insure her car against theft or damage (ii) Repeat the calculation in the previous part but now assume Alice has £500000 in the bank.
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function (sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Suppose that insurance companies do not know specific probabilities of adverse events for Tess or Lex, but do know the average probability of an adverse event. If they assumed that both Tess and Lex purchase full insurance, what is the actuarially fair premium charged? Round to two decimal places
At a different table, Juan wins $600 in a blackjack game. Similarly, he has to choose between $600 or the chance to play a new game. In this game, Juan has a 60% chance of winning nothing and a 40% of winning $1,000. The following graph presents the utility function of Juan with respect to money: U(w) U(w) U(1,000) U(700) U(600) U(400) 400 600 700 1,000 w 10.2.2 1.0 point possible (graded, results hidden) By how much money would his winnings need to increase or decrease so that Juan is indifferent between the $600 and the new game? (in case of an increase, insert a positive number; in case of a decrease, insert a negative number).
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function ( sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Calculate Lex’s and Tess' expected utilities without insurance. (each one separated) Round to two decimal places for both
2. Alex and Bill share a flat. Alex enjoys reading in silence, while Bill enjoys listening to loud music. Bill controls his music system, which can produce noise levels up to 100 Decibels. Bill has no cash but Alex has £100. Their utility functions are given by: UA = 10(100 – D)i + (100 – M), %3D Ug = 10(D)i + M, where D denotes the Decibel level chosen by Bill, and M denotes any cash given to Bill by Alex. (a) Explain how Bill's music level affects Alex. Find the contract curve between Alex and Bill. Why is there a unique Pareto efficient noise level? (b) What is the maximum amount Alex would be willing to pay Bill to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? What is the minimum amount Bill would be willing to accept in order to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? Can the Pareto efficient noise level be achieved through private bargaining?
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function (sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 If an insurance company knows the probability of Tess experiencing an adverse event, what is the actuarially fair premium charged to Tess per $1 of benefit? Round to two decimal places
6) You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!), and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: I. There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). II. Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. III. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. IV. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on…
6) You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!), and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: I. There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). II. Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. III. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. IV. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on…