Joab and his friends used to play a game where they put on a dog's electric fence collar and tried to stand over the electric fence line because, after careful consideration of the costs and benefits, they decided that the benefits of watching their friends get shocked outweighed the costs of being shocked themselves. According to the economic way of thinking, by playing this game, Joab and his friends were O not responding to the incentives they faced. O making an irrational choice. O making a rational choice. O not fully considering the costs and benefits of their decision since this is obviously a mistake for anybody to do.

Joab and his friends used to play a game where they put on a dog's electric fence collar and tried to stand over the electric fence line because, after careful consideration of the costs and benefits, they decided that the benefits of watching their friends get shocked outweighed the costs of being shocked themselves. According to the economic way of thinking, by playing this game, Joab and his friends were O not responding to the incentives they faced. O making an irrational choice. O making a rational choice. O not fully considering the costs and benefits of their decision since this is obviously a mistake for anybody to do.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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