Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 4 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 4 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 2 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward VoteDon't VoteMr. WardVoteMr. Ward: -2, Mrs. Ward: -2Mr. Ward: 2, Mrs. Ward: -4 Don't VoteMr. Ward: -4, Mrs. Ward: 2Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to (vote/not vote) and for Mrs. Ward to (vote/not vote) . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election.True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. True False This agreement not to vote (is/is not) a Nash equilibrium.

Nash's equilibrium is a process for each player where individual strategy is the best reaction to…

Answered: Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote…

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.1IP

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Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 4 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 4 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 2 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward.

		Mrs. Ward
		Vote	Don't Vote
Mr. Ward	Vote	Mr. Ward: -2, Mrs. Ward: -2	Mr. Ward: 2, Mrs. Ward: -4
	Don't Vote	Mr. Ward: -4, Mrs. Ward: 2	Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0

The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to (vote/not vote) and for Mrs. Ward to (vote/not vote) . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility.

Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election.

True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question.

True

False

This agreement not to vote (is/is not) a Nash equilibrium.

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