Q25. In the solution of the game, does Victor ask Hermione to go to the Yule ball? Yes No Q26. In the solution of the game, does Hermione say yes to Victor? Yes No

Suppose you would have to pay Alicia at least $150 to get her to part with a ticket she just bought to see her favorite band play next Friday. Loss aversion implies that if Alicia had not yet bought the ticket, she would:   Multiple Choice   no longer be interested in purchasing it.   be willing to pay more than $150 for it.   be willing to pay exactly $150 for it.   be willing to pay less than $150 for it.

You are considering two options for your next family vacation. You can visit Disney World or Chicago. Your utility from Disney World is 100 if the weather is clear, and 0 if it rains. Chicago is worth a utility of 70 if the weather is clear and a utility of 40 if the weather is rainy. Also assume that the chance of rain at Disney World is going to be 50% and the chance of rain in Chicago is 40%. As a utility maximizer, should you plan to go to Disney World or Chicago? (Explain using relevant equations)

Rachael starts out with 10 lobsters and 5 coconuts. Freya starts out with 10 lobsters and 15 coconuts. After trading, Rachael ends up with 8 lobsters and 10 coconuts. Rachael feels neither better nor worse off than when she started but cannot get Freya to agree to any more trades. Freya feels better off than when she started. Draw the Edgeworth box consistent with this story.

Suppose you observe a person's answer to two decision problems. Problem 1: You are offered $40 today. What is the minimum amount x you demand one month from today in order to be willing to give up the $40 now? Answer: x = 52. Problem 2: Your are offered $40 today. What is the minimum amount x you demand one year from today in order to be willing to give up the $40 now? Answer: $60. 1. Demonstrate that the rational model of time preferences is violated for this choice pattern. 2. Derive this individual's B and d for the hyperbolic time discounting model. 3. Suppose the utility you get from eating ice cream now is 10 utils. But you pay a cost of -4 utils per hour for the next 4 hours, because it gives you indigestion and makes you feel lethargic. If your hourly B and d for this problem are B = .6 and d = .9, ... 1. What is the total discounted utility of eating ice cream now? 2. What is your total discounted utility now of planning to eat ice cream after lunch tomorrow? 3. Do you eat ice…

39   In the following sequential game, person 1 chooses first and person 2 chooses second. Using backward induction, what choice should person 1 make?  chooses no if person 2 chooses no chooses yes if person 2 chooses yes chooses yes chooses no

The movie theater in Glendon has two types of customers: domestic students (group 1) and international students (group 2). At a price of p, cents, the number of movie tickets that domestic students are willing to buy per year is given by: q₁-170-0.7p₁. At a price of p₂ cents, the number of movie tickets that international students are willing to buy per year is given by: 92-87-0.3p₂. The total costs for the movie theater depend on the total number of tickets sold, q₁+92, and are given by the following total cost function C(q₁+92)=(91+9₂)². Suppose that the movie theater can identify which students are domestic and which students are international, and students are unable to resell movie tickets to each other. This enables the theater to charge different prices to domestic vs international students. How many movie tickets will domestic students buy (9₁)? How many movie tickets will international students buy (9₂)?

When a famous painting becomes available for sale, it is often known which museum or collector will be the likely winner. Yet, the auctioneer actively woos representatives of other museums that have no chance of winning to attend anyway. Suppose a piece of art has recently become available for sale and will be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the winner paying an amount equal to the second highest bid. Assume that most collectors know that Yakov places a value of $35,000 on the art piece and that he values this art piece more than any other collector. Suppose that if no one else shows up, Yakov simply bids $35,0002=$17,500 $35,000 2 = $17,500 and wins the piece of art. The expected price paid by Yakov, with no other bidders present, is. Suppose the owner of the artwork manages to recruit another bidder, Bob, to the auction. Bob is known to value the art piece at $28,000. The expected price paid by Yakov, given the presence of the second bidder Bob, is.

15. A total of 10 players are each choosing a number from {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8). If a player's number equals exactly half of the average of the numbers sub- mitted by the other nine players, then she is paid $100; otherwise, she is paid 0. Solve for the strategies that survive the IDSDS.

Give step by step answer with final answer