What the information sets in the above game denote?  Player 2 does not observe the action of player 1, so he does not know in which decision node he/she is playing at.   Player 2 does not observe the precise action of player 1, but he does know that player 1 has played either one between a and b, or one between c and d.   Player 2 doe

7 Find all subgame perfect equilibria of the game

Which of the above 4 statements is CORRECT?

39   In the following sequential game, person 1 chooses first and person 2 chooses second. Using backward induction, what choice should person 1 make?  chooses no if person 2 chooses no chooses yes if person 2 chooses yes chooses yes chooses no

Consider the game below. How many best responses does Player 1 have to strategy L of Player 2? 1) 0 2)1 3) 2 4)3 Player 1 T M B L 2,0 2, 2 2,3 Player 2 с 2,1 3,2 1, 2 R 3,2 0,1 0,3

Consider the extensive form game show in the figure below. How many strategies does Player 2 have in this game? 6 Numerical answer a2 (2,2,1) 2 a1 b₂ 1 (2,4,2) 3 C₂ a3 by a2 d₂ (3,5,3) (3,1,2) b₂ b3 (4,2,0) (2,0,2) az (3) b3 (0,3,4)

Consider the following game   1\2 Y Z A 10,3 3,9 B 8,5 6,1   Suppose Player 2 holds the following belief about Player 1: θ1 (A,B) = (9/10,1/10) What is the expected payoff from playing ‘Y’ ? What is the expected payoff from playing ‘Z’ ? Based on these beliefs, player 2 should respond by playing _____

PLEASE HOW TO THINK ABOUT IT AND SOLVE

5

Return to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits to her choice of effort level first. On observing this decision, Nancy commits to her own effort level. What is the subgame - perfect equilibrium of the game where the joint profits are 5m + 4n+ mn, the costs of their efforts to Monica and Nancy are m2 and n2, respectively, and Monica commits to an effort level first? Compare the payoffs to Monica and Nancy with those found in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Does this game have a first-mover or second - mover advantage? Using the same joint profit function as in part (a), find the subgame - perfect equilibrium for the game where Nancy must commit first to an effort level. U10. Return to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits…