With an initial wealth of $160,000, a consumer who abides by the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms faces a fire risk. A big fire with a loss of 70,000 has a 5% 0.5 chance of happening, while a disastrous fire with a loss of 120,000 has a 5% chance of happening. U = W is the utility function for her. She is given the option to purchase an insurance policy with a deductibility clause requiring her to pay the initial $7620 of any fire losses. What is the highest premium she is prepared to pay for this coverage?

With an initial wealth of $160,000, a consumer who abides by the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms faces a fire risk. A big fire with a loss of 70,000 has a 5% 0.5 chance of happening, while a disastrous fire with a loss of 120,000 has a 5% chance of happening. U = W is the utility function for her. She is given the option to purchase an insurance policy with a deductibility clause requiring her to pay the initial $7620 of any fire losses. What is the highest premium she is prepared to pay for this coverage?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.1P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) = square root x . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain
. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) √x . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain.
Burger Prince Restaurant is considering the purchase of a $100,000 fire insurance policy. The fire statistics indicate that in a given year the probability of property damage in a fire is as follows: Fire Damage $100,000 $75,000 $50,000 $25,000 $10,000 $0 Probability .006 .002 .004 .003 .005 .980 If Burger Prince was risk neutral, how much would they be willing to pay for fire insurance? If Burger Prince has the utility values given below, approximately how much would they be willing to pay for fire insurance? Loss $100,000 $75,000 $50,000 $25,000 $10,000 $5,000 $0 Utility 0 30 60 85 95 99 100
A driver's wealth $100,000 includes a car of $20,000. To install a car alarm costs the driver $1,750. The probability that the car is stolen is 0.2 when the car does not have an alarm and 0.1 when the car does have an alarm. Assume the driver's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is U(W) = ln(W). Suppose the driver is deciding between the following three options: (a) purchase no car insurance, do not install car alarm; (b) purchase fair insurance to replace the car, do not install car alarm; and (c) purchase no car insurance, install car alarm. Of these three options, the driver prefers: A. option (a). B. option (b). C. option (c). D. options (a) and (b). E. options (a) and (c). F. options (b) and (c). G. all options equally. H. none of these options.
Consider the following utility functions for wealth w: (i) u(w) = 3w, (ii) u(w) = w^1/3, (iii) u(w) = w + sqrt(w), (iv) u(w) = w*sqrt(w). Which of these is most risk-averse (has the highest Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion) at w = 1?A. (i)B. (ii)C. (iii)D. (iv)
Consider the following claim: “If a decision maker prefers one given lottery that yields $x with probability 1 over another given lottery whose expected return is $x, then we can fully characterize the agent's risk attitude. That is, this information comparing two given lotteries is enough to determine if the decision maker is risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral.” If this claim is TRUE, then provide a proof. If it is FALSE, then prove your argument by providing an explanation.
Dr. Gambles has a utility function given as U(w)=In(w). Due to the pandemic affecting his consulting business, Dr Gambles faces the prospect of having his wealth reduced to £2 or £75,000 or £100,000 with probabilities of 0.15, 0.25, and 0.60, respectively. Suppose insurance is available that will protect his wealth from this risk. How much would he be willing to pay for such insurance?
Find the Pratt - Arrow risk - aversion function for a utility function U(W) = log(0.5-W + 500), where W is the amount of wealth in €. Suppose that an investor's wealth is subject to outcomes -800 €, 500 €, 500 € and 1, 000 € which affect the initial amount of 2,500 € with probabilities of their occurrence 40%, 15%, 15% and 30%, respectively. a) Using the Taylor approximation to certainty equivalent, calculate an approximate expected utility value. b) Calculate the certain equivalent of the investor's uncertain wealth. Interpret.
Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary’s boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary’s boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary’s utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x1 and x2 are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary’s total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.
Leo owns one share of Anteras, a semiconductor chip company which may have to recall millions of chips. The stock currently trades at $100/share. Leo believes the probability that they have to recall the chips is 50%. If the chips have to be recalled, the stock price will be cut in half, but otherwise it will remain $100. The expected value of Leo's share is ______ Assume Leo has the utility function, U(X)=√X. The minimum price Leo would accept to sell his share is _______ Leo's risk premium is ________
Suppose the equilibrium price for good quality used cars is $20,000. And the equilibrium price for poor quality used cars is $10,000. Assume a potential used car buyer has imperfect information as to the condition of any given used car. Assume this potential buyer believes the probability a given used car is good quality is .60 and the probability a given used car is low quality is .40. Assume the seller has perfect information on all cars in inventory. If the seller sells the buyer a poor quality car, what is the net-benefit to the seller? a. A net gain of $6,000. b. A net loss of $20,000. c. A net loss of $6,000. d. A net gain of $10,000.
. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) = square root x. There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain. b) What would be the highest price (premium) that she would be willing to pay for an insurance policy that fully insures her against the flooding damage?