a) The Melian Dialogue presents the negotiations between the Athenians and the Melians regarding the imminent invasion and conquer of the island of Melos for expansion purposes. The Athenians give the Melians two options: surrender or be destroyed. From the negotiation, the Melians reasonably expect war and understand that the “contrary case, slavery” is a conceivable possibility (CCW 56). The Melians recognize that the Athenians are much stronger, however, they refuse to submit as subrogation is the outcome. In this instance, the Melians adopted a liberal perspective as they focused on the wellbeing of their civilization. The Athenians argued that the Melians “would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we …show more content…
The Athenians believed they had been wronged and that “the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must” (CCW 57). The Melian Dialogue is a commentary on the impact of power hungry nations and how a haughty approach is often unnecessary and leads to conflicts that could otherwise be avoided. The independent variable is the domination sought after by acquisitive unions such as the Athenians. The dependent variable is the war and tyranny that can result from hostility between such prideful nations. Furthermore, the theory that amity equals weakness is presented in The Melian Dialogue by the Athenians. The Athenians respond to the Melians request for neutrality by stating that “your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness” (CCW 57). According to the Athenians, equality represented impotence and vulnerability. The independent variable is the superiority necessary to prove strength and power. The dependent variable is the way in which other nations perceived the Athenians regarding their capability and vehemence. 2. In regards to international relations, power is influence and control one state has over another. Often times, state power is an indication of economic and military strength. According to Joseph Nye, the concept of using economic and military forces to coerce other political bodies is known as hard power. In contrast,
Without being either the ones who made this law or the first to apply it after it was laid down, we applied it as one in existence...and one that will endure for all time,” (Thuc., V, 105). The Athenians see no injustice in doing simply as their nature impels them to do. In fact, the Athenians see their offer of subjugation to the Melian people as more than reasonable, “What we will demonstrate is that we are here to help our empire and that there is salvation for your city in what we are now about to say, since we hope to rule over you without trouble and let both parties benefit as you are saved,” (Thuc., V, 91). Following their belief in doing what is necessary to strengthen themselves, even at the expense of others, is what brings Athens to Melos.
Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.
A reading of Thucydides’, Pericles’ Funeral Oration and The Melian Dialogue uncovers both contrasting and comparable viewpoints on Athenian politics, power, aims of war, and empire. Thucydides presents two differing characteristics of Athens, one as the civilizer in Pericles’ funeral oration and the other as an tyrant in the Melian dialogue. In the funeral oration delivered by Pericles during the first year of the war, the Athenian leader emphasizes the idealized personal image of the Athenians in regard to their constitution and good character. Pericles goes on to praise the Athenian democratic institution of Athens that contributes to their cities greatness; in Pericles’s own words, “The Athenian administration favors the many instead of few… they afford equal justice to all of their differences” (112, 2.37). This quote emphasizes the good character of the Athens’ to coax and encourage the Athenians to preserve and better their great empire into the future. On the other hand, in the Melian dialogue, this notion of justice and equality is irrelevant; one, because Athens compared to Melos, is the stronger of the two and thus, is more powerful. Further, Athens, will continue to acquire absolute power and build its empire by conquering Melos and whomever else stands in its way. Through Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, the following conclusions/themes will demonstrate both the changing and somewhat stable nature of Athenian policy with regards to empire,
In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential
Thucydides also used other’s speeches as resources to show insight into the events occurring. He used the Melian dialogue to show the wit of the Athenians and illustrate their impulsive desire to conquer independent cities (Thucydides p. 102-108). This passage illustrates the beginning of the end for the Athenians. The Melians were a colony of the Lacedaemonians and did not take a side in the ongoing war, but Athens eventually probed them to war (Thucydides 102). This foreshadows the battle at Syracuse in which Athens went blindly into out of desire to simply slight the Spartans. Thucydides uses speeches to show insight to the people’s thoughts and to add foreshadowing to future events.
In the ancient societies of Greece, war means many things; power, glory, honor. The idea of fighting is not just a daily task for the Greeks but a necessity. In
In Chapter 1, the author assesses the unique and eternal achievements of 5th century BCE Athenian culture. She introduces several basic dichotomies that define her understanding of the writers and events of the period in the later chapters.
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
The Peloponnesian War was the turning point in Athenian hegemony in Ancient Greece. It was fought in 431 B.C. between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. According to Thucydides, Athens’ imposing hegemonic status and its overwhelming quest for more power made the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s eventual fall from power inevitable. Despite the Athenians having a far more superior navy and being considerably wealthier, they were defeated and made subjects of Sparta. In this paper, I will discuss Thucydides’ and Socrates’ reasons for why
“’We used to think that our neutrality was a wise thing;… now we see it clearly as a lack of foresight and as a source of weakness. / It is a situation where we… will be grateful to you, the world in general will admire your generosity, and you yourselves will be stronger than you were before,’” (Thucydides, 54-5)
This essay examines the evolution of the Athens strategy from the beginning to the end of The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BCE). The Strategy will be evaluated in the context of the relationship of ends, means, and ways by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk.
The Melian Dialogue is a debate between Melian and Athenian representatives concerning the sovereignty of Melos. The debate did not really occur-the arguments given by each side were of Thucydides own creation. Thus it is reasonable to assume that we can tease out Thucydides' own beliefs. In this paper, I will first extract Thucydides views from the Melian Dialogue and then analyze whether or not these views are well founded.
Thucydides, in structuring the Melian Dialogue explicitly shows us that the Melos is a smaller and weaker nation in comparison to Athens however, the Melians’ illogicality of weakness to go up against Athens can somewhat justify the Athenians act of being greedy. The Athenians stresses the senselessness of resistance and the inescapably of capitulation but the Melians remain steadfast in their decision to be neutral and tries to shift the argument to issues of justice and hints at the possibility of human and divine assistance. The Athenians aware of the weakness of the Melians says, “Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those
Power is the ability to control others or one’s entity. Accordingly it can be defined as a kind of strength or as an authority. There are various theorisations about the meaning of this term in sociology thus it would be hard to give a comprehensive
Joseph Nye offers an alternative theory for the construct of State power. He created a system in which State power is broken into two parts; “hard power” and “soft power.” “Hard power” consists of the traditional, tangible aspects of power namely, military and economic power. “Soft power” is the key distinguishing dynamic of Nye’s work from other theories. “Soft power” consists of all other facets of power, such as ideology, foreign policy, culture, stability, prosperity, and membership in international organizations (Bound to Lead 130 and Paradox xi, 8). The modern world is becoming more interconnected and interdependent with one another, hence depending less on “sticks and carrots” and more on “soft power.” The missing link within perceived State power is the role morality plays in actual power. This study will show that “soft power” is implicitly, and at rare times explicitly, founded in moral values.